Baseline Survey on the state of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................ 3
Acronyms And Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 7
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 9

1 Preliminaries ................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Background Information ........................................................................................ 1
   1.2 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2
      1.2.1 General Overview of the Study ...................................................................... 2
      1.2.2 Study Methodology, Assumptions and Limitations ....................................... 3
      1.2.3 Definitions ..................................................................................................... 4

2 Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 7
   2.1 Regional and International Instruments .................................................................. 7
   2.2 Conflict dynamics ................................................................................................ 10

3 Cross Cutting Issues Affecting Human Security ......................................................... 13
   3.1 Cattle Rustling ....................................................................................................... 13
   3.2 Cultural practices .................................................................................................. 15
   3.3 Value for affluence .............................................................................................. 15
   3.4 Poverty ................................................................................................................ 16
   3.5 Societal Dynamics ............................................................................................ 17
   3.6 Armed Rebellion ............................................................................................. 17

4 Situation Analysis (Field Research) ............................................................................ 19
   4.1 Regional Perspective ........................................................................................... 19
   4.2 Burundi ............................................................................................................. 21
      4.2.1 Degree and level of proliferation ................................................................. 21
      4.2.2 Root causes of proliferation, corridors and transit roots........................... 22
      4.2.3 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) ............................ 23
      4.2.4 Role of FECCLAHA .................................................................................... 23
   4.3 Ethiopia .............................................................................................................. 25
      4.3.1 Degree and level of proliferation .................................................................. 25
      4.3.2 Root causes of proliferation, corridors and transit roots............................ 27
      4.3.3 Best Practices on Pastoralism ..................................................................... 27
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.3.4</td>
<td>Initiatives to address proliferation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.5</td>
<td>Challenges and Opportunities</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>Root causes</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>Level of proliferation, corridors and transit roots</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3</td>
<td>Initiatives to address the proliferation of SALW</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.4</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.5</td>
<td>Role of FECCLAHA</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>Root causes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>Proliferation, corridors and transit roots</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.4</td>
<td>Alternative means of livelihood</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.5</td>
<td>Initiatives to address SALW</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.6</td>
<td>Role of FECCLAHA</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.1</td>
<td>Root causes</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.2</td>
<td>Proliferation and transit roots</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.3</td>
<td>Initiatives to address proliferation</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Situation Analysis (Desk Research)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1</td>
<td>Root causes corridors and transit roots</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>Degree and level of proliferation</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3</td>
<td>Initiatives to address proliferation</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.4</td>
<td>Role of FECCLAHA</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Status on the Implementation of The Nairobi Protocol</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgement

This is a report of a Baseline Survey on the state of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region. It contains sections on Literature Review, Cross Cutting Issues exacerbating Small Arms in the region, and a situation analysis drawn from the field and through a desk review. It also contains regional issues aggravating SALWs as well as Emerging trends in the region.

This study was made possible by funding from the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Bread for the World. We deeply appreciate them for their continued financial support and appreciate their sustained accompaniment to the Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme over the years.

We are very grateful for the input made by the various respondents and experts consulted during the field study. The synthesized report benefitted from the individual country studies undertaken in Ethiopia, Burundi, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. In each of these countries, the respondents were drawn from government ministries responsible for internal security, intergovernmental bodies; Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), African Union, United Nations Agencies, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN), National Focal Points, National Council of Churches, and Experts in the field. These were the primary sources of data and information. Additionally, we express our gratitude to the authors and contributors of the documents and reports which we used as secondary sources in compiling this report.

We thank the Consultant, Ms. Augusta Gichane, for her hard work and commitment to not only ensuring the successful completion of this task; but that the report is comprehensive and of high quality.

It is our hope and prayer that you will find this report useful in your engagements and efforts towards the reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the region.

Elizabeth Z. Kisiigha (Mrs.)
Executive Director
FECCCLAHA
**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>Christian Council of Tanzania</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNEB</td>
<td>National Council of Churches of Burundi</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Protestant Council of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPCCO</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Police Chief’s Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>Church of Christ in Congo</td>
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<td>EECMY</td>
<td>Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus</td>
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<td>ELCE</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Eritrean Orthodox Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>FECCCLAHA</td>
<td>Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIDDPP</td>
<td>Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
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<td>National Council of Churches of Kenya</td>
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<td>NFPPs</td>
<td>National Focal Points</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms</td>
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<td>RoC</td>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<td>SERK</td>
<td>Secure Electronic Record Keeping</td>
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<td>SSANSA</td>
<td>South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>SSCC</td>
<td>South Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJCC</td>
<td>Uganda Joint Christian Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda’s People Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPoA</td>
<td>UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

The situation of human security in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa Regions continues to pose great threat to individuals, communities and states in spite of the multi-faceted interventions made by respective players. Insecurity posed by the easy availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) complicates the situation.

Peace has been elusive considering the number and length of conflicts in the region, particularly relating to; resources, political competition and economic disparity. Internationalisation of the conflicts also compounds the situation thus making resolution far-fetched. Conflicts largely contribute and drive the demand and supply of SALW, therefore worsening the human security situation in the region.

As a faith based organisation, FECCLAHA has a competitive advantage based on a broad network of membership in ten countries led by the Secretariat. The network has representation from the grassroots, national and regional levels. In this respect, FECCLAHA will continue making significant contribution towards improving human security in the region.

The Secretariat has constituent membership in ten countries; Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. As a regional organisation, FECCLAHA’s constituency serves towards information dissemination, conflict prevention and resolution as well as peace building.

Roles and responsibilities of various players in making contribution to human security have been undertaken by the state, inter-governmental bodies, international organisations, research institutions, civil society and community based organisations respectively. Presence in each of the ten countries provides the organisation with the comparative advantage of creating linkages with the different stakeholders and players in the region. Partnership with the respective players complements information dissemination and creating awareness.

The process of addressing SALW and human security requires partnership between the state, inter-governmental and civil society organisations as well as communities. To improve such partnerships, state-civil society dialogue would be necessary for creating the required linkages. Such a forum is lacking and could be facilitated through the FECCLAHA Secretariat.

Several disarmament initiatives have been undertaken in a number of the countries under review. From the early 90s to date, disarmament exercises have largely been forceful as respective governments made attempt to recover illegal SALW amongst communities. In spite of several disarmament exercises in each country, proliferation of SALW still continued and the governments have had to change tact.

In most of the countries in the region, forceful disarmament has been replaced by practical disarmament, which addresses the underlying causes of proliferation of SALW. Also, provides sustainable solutions through the provision of infrastructure
and ensuring good governance. This report notes that FECLLAHA’s role would be to prepare the communities ahead of disarmament exercise by informing them of the government’s intentions and objectives. In addition, the role of FECLLAHA would be to seek communities’ cooperation in view of improving human security and safety.

Following research conducted in the region on Disarmament, Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) published findings on Best Practices Guidelines. FECLLAHA’s has a significant role to play in terms of unpacking and interpretation of the Guidelines in the best interest of the affected communities. This could be achieved in liaison with RECSA, governments and likeminded institutions.

A number of international, regional and national instruments have been established to address the proliferation of SALW. In most cases, communities are not aware of the existence of such instruments or lack sufficient information. In addition to information dissemination, FECLLAHA’s role would also involve monitoring the implementation of the instruments. In addition, ensure that governments in the region fast track implementation to the advantage and benefit of the communities.

Legal language used in most national, regional and international instruments guiding states on the prevention of SALW proliferation is complicated and the issues are also complex. It was noted that so far, only a few organisations are making effort in interpretation of the legal instruments in a language that could be understood by the communities. This is a gap that FECLLAHA could fill through unpacking the instruments into simpler language and producing simple media messages.

Inter-governmental organisations play important roles based on their mandate and role in security, peace and conflict management as well addressing the menace caused by small arms proliferation. However, in most cases, intergovernmental organisations have to identify regional and local organisations to complement their efforts at the grassroots level. For instance, the (Africa Union) AU Commission has as Continental Strategy Framework towards ameliorating SALW.

For all intents and purposes, the AU Commission would require civil society groups to work with in the implementation process. This is a role cut-out for FECLLAHA as a regional faith based organisation with grassroots comparative advantage. Areas of engagement based on FECLLAHA’s strengths as referenced are; dissemination, awareness creation, advocacy and creating a linkage between international organisations and respective communities.

In terms of fundraising, the research found that while it is true that donor funding has been dwindling over the past decade, partnership with international organisations increases the opportunity of tapping resources allocated for implementation. For instance, FECLLAHA should fundraise to support the implementation of the AU Strategy Framework on SALW. Also, some donors might be interested in supporting the implementation of specific provisions of the Nairobi Protocol.

International organisations have broad but specific mandate which requires input from civil society. For example, research institutions regularly produce in-depth
analysis based on primary research. Depending on the scope and research objectives, community representatives participate as key respondents. Hence, advocacy on research findings against the backdrop of FECCLAHA’s inherent strength and a solid constituency across the region is as powerful as it is fundamental.

Decline of value system in most countries largely contribute to crime and violent conflicts where individuals and communities experience the brunt of insecurity. Based on her comparative advantage, FECCLAHA’s role was noted to be of significant contribution in restoring value system as an effective approach towards addressing some of the problems facing communities, particularly gender based violence and deviant youth who engage in violent crime.

Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) has been instrumental in the prevention and reduction of conflicts in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Similar mechanism for early warning on the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) need to be established. This is an important contribution that FECCLAHA should make with least effort through the existing network of the ten constituent members.

FECCLAHA’s presence in each of the ten countries constituting her membership provides a good foundation for the Secretariat’s engagement. Most of the respondents interviewed that with minimal financial commitment, FECCLAHA’s participation addressing SALW would continue making huge impact towards improving human security. A good example would be a well coordinated Global Week of Action against Gun Violence conducted simultaneously to create awareness, demand state action on SALW control and disseminate messages of peace through the media.
1 Preliminaries

1.1 Background Information

The Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA) is a regional ecumenical body consisting of churches and national councils of churches in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa. Since its inception, FECCLAHA has continued to provide a platform for members to share perspectives on issues of common concern, particularly with regard to peaceful co-existence. Also, it has been fostering strong ecumenical cooperation through offering leadership in conflict prevention, transformation and peace building.

The membership of FECCLAHA is comprised of Christian Councils and Churches spread in ten countries namely: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The current members include: National Council of Churches of Burundi (CNEB), Church of Christ in Congo (ECC), Eritrean Orthodox Church (EOC), Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea (ELCE), Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), Protestant Council of Rwanda (CPR), South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC).

Since inception, FECCLAHA has always taken cognizance of the fact that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), poses serious threat to human security in the region of her mandate that is the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. It is also pertinent that the dangers posed by SALWs would undermine peace and tranquility in the region. In partnership with other likeminded organisations, FECCLAHA has been participating and making contribution towards addressing the proliferation of SALW.

Activities undertaken by FECCLAHA on issues of SALW were within the framework of the First Strategic Plan of 2009 – 2013. Upon its expiry, a new Strategic Plan 2014-2018 has since been launched to propel FECCLAHA’s engagements in human security for the next five years. It is against this backdrop that the Baseline Survey was conducted with the view to identifying specific areas of engagement and contribution.

FECCLAHA programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) is pegged on the theme on Human Security. The strategic goal of Human Security is “to address the threats to human security and the underlying causes of conflict in the region.” The FECCLAHA aims at building the capacity and facilitating her constituent member
Councils and Churches to engage and advocate for the implementation of protocols and legal instruments on SALWs with a focus on the Nairobi Protocol.\(^1\)

The purpose of the baseline survey was to sharpen FECCLAHA’s engagement as it embarks on the implementation of the Strategic Plan 2014-2018. The survey sought to outline opportunities that FECCLAHA and its members can tap on to. It drew up possible linkages and opportunities for collaboration between FECCLAHA and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as well as gaps and possible entry points for new partnerships.

The baseline survey on the state of SALWs in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa focused on the following: situation analysis, the Protocols and other international/regional legal instruments on SALWs; with a focus on the Nairobi Protocol. Further, the survey identified gaps, possible areas of collaboration, and the contribution of FECCLAHA and her constituent members. In addition, the survey analyzed dimensions of gender, youth and emerging trends relating to SALW proliferation.

The focus of the study was Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. Remaining half of the membership constituted secondary sources based on broad desk research. These members includes; DR Congo, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania. Each of the national councils are at different levels in terms of; development, technology, democracy, implementation of national, regional and international instruments. Consequently, each of the countries has to be appreciated in respect to its unique position.

**1.2 Introduction**

**1.2.1 General Overview of the Study**

A number of sections constitute this report in an effort to condense a rather broadscope of study and to consolidate discussion. The preliminary section constitutes of background information and introduction. Literature review follows and it is in two sections; regional and international instruments and conflicts dynamics. A third part envisaged on mapping the movement of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Regions was left out due to technicalities involved in terms of information available and time limitation.

The fourth section analyses cross cutting issues affecting human security: cattle rustling, cultural practices, value of affluence, poverty, social dynamics and armed rebellion. It was deemed imperative to discuss the above items as a preamble to the rest of the sections due to the inter-connectedness of the issues.

Situation analysis as a core section of this report is in section five. It commences with a broad regional perspective and as a precursor to the country case studies covering; Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The discussion is presented in varying headings dependent on the information available. Broadly the sub-headings includes; degree and level of proliferation, root causes, corridors and transit roots, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration, best practices and the role of FECCLAHA as applicable.
The sixth section analyses FECCLHA’s other constituent members found in the following countries; DR Congo, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. It is important to state that discussion on these five countries is largely drawn from secondary sources as the consultant did not visit the countries. Only five countries constituted primary data as above, forming the core of analysis in this report.

Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol as the key instrument of this study is reviewed in section six. Each of the ten countries is discussed based on information gathered from the field and reports provided by Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA).

The seventh section analyses the regional issues and emerging trends that in one way or the other have a bearing on human security and SALW. Among the topics discussed are: disarmament; international terrorism; youth, gender and small arms; human migration and trafficking; trans-border and organized crime; armed militia and rebel groups as well as natural resources.

The key findings were consolidated in section eight with sub-headings including; strategic partnerships. Part of the Terms of Reference spelt out the need to find out possible areas of collaboration and FECCLHA’s contribution. In line with this expectation, the study identified a number of organisations that FECCLHA could partner with. Strategic partnership is recommended with Saferworld, an international civil society organisation; UN Development Programme (UNDP) due to its national presence in most of the countries in the region and IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).

The study noted the need to develop early warning mechanisms on SALW. This could be developed in partnership with RECSA and IGAD-CEWARN. Partnership should also be sought with research organisations such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), for the purpose of advocacy on research findings.

Other key findings are presented under the sub-heading on media outreach stressing the need to work along with relevant media houses. Capacity building and training; implementation of regional instruments, best practices leveraging on the Church and FECCLHA’s mileage are also discussed and recommendations made accordingly.

Final section and perhaps the most important discuss areas of FECCLHA engagement. Some opportunities are envisaged to be of immediate term while others are in medium and long term mode depending on the FECCLHA’s priorities.

Realistically, recommendations made here-in require financial availability to steer practical action to logical conclusion and to the benefit of the affected communities. A few suggestions are made of institutions that might be approached with convincing proposals for fund raising purposes.

1.2.2 Study Methodology, Assumptions and Limitations

The study is based on primary data collected from experts, practitioners, government officials, national focal points and civil society representatives through one-on-one interviews. Due to varying reasons, one respondent was interviewed via Skype while another was interviewed telephonically.
In consideration of financial and time limitations, the field study was largely conducted at the capitals of; Burundi, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda from 22nd of October to 30th of November 2013. Field research in Kenya stretched from December 2013 to January 2014. Most of the experts consulted have long experience in the field, specifically on; peace, security, conflict and mainstreaming SALW. Hence, lack of primary data from the country side did not affect the quality of the report given that the respondents pride of long experience and broad knowledge in the field. Also, they have direct or indirect linkages at the grassroots.

A number of documents were reviewed for additional information such as Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) Reports and Bulletins; published research reports and literature on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), conflict and human security. Relevant websites were visited for additional information.

At commissioning, it was assumed that the time allocated for the study and compilation of the report would be within a period of 23 consolidated working days. The Consultant originally had proposed 33 days and expressed to the Secretariat that much more time would be required to complete the Final Report. Given the financial limitations that FECCLAHA was experiencing at the time, the Consultant consolidated the work period to 33 days even though much more time would be required to cover ten countries. However, FECCLAHA Secretariat reduced the days to 23 postulating that a shorter time would be sufficient.

The other assumption was that all the respondents would be readily available. Also, the information gathered would be processed, analysed and synthesized within the time allocated. In reality, extra time was required to secure appointments with the respondents ahead of each country visit. The consultant had to take the earliest and last flights available in an effort to maximize on time in each capital. Research study in Kenya was slowed down by the Holiday season at the end of the year. There was a spill-over effect extending to the month of January which also comes with various obligations and challenges. In this respect, the Nairobi based experts were not easily available over the period.

Compiling a report study covering ten countries is not a mean assignment. All factors considered, writing a report for one country, depending on the scope, is time intensive. To compile this report, the Consultant invested time and sacrificed other engagements for quality assurance. These factors explain the reasons that led to the Report being submitted in February 2014 as opposed to December 2013.

1.2.3 Definitions

Terms and concepts that are constantly referenced in this study report are defined in this section. The aim is to assist the reader deepen understanding and application of the terms in context. These includes; human security, practical disarmament, small arms and light weapons and cattle rustling.

At FECCLAHA, the programme on SALWs is pegged on the theme on Human Security with the strategic goal of addressing threats and underlying causes of conflict in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. Therefore, the term human security is unpacked with an inclination to understanding threats and underlying causes.
**Human security**

At the United Nations, the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established in May 2004 in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The goals of the HSU are to underscore the importance of human security for all, respond to different situation of human security, develop practical tools and disseminate lessons learned and foster collaboration. The Human Security Unit manages the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) as well as supports ongoing discussions within the UN General Assembly on human security.²

In terms of justification, FECCLAHA’s approach on SALW from the perspective of human security is anchored on the above outlined Human Security Unit goals particularly developing practical tools while addressing SALW, dissemination to the communities and collaboration with like-minded organisations.

The other dimension is the application of human security from a dual policy framework based on mutually reinforcing pillars of protection and empowerment. Once communities are protected from the menace caused by SALW, they get empowered to improve their respective environment for the greater good of all within the society, nationally, regionally and globally.

Human security is a dynamic and practical policy framework for addressing widespread and cross-cutting threats facing governments and people. Human security promotes the development of early warning mechanisms that help to mitigate the impact of current threats, and where possible, prevents the occurrence of future threats.³ This conforms to the idea of conflict prevention and the recommendation regarding collaboration with IGAD Conflict Early Warning Mechanism.

United Nations General Assembly – UNGA Resolution adds more emphasis that human security recognizes the inter-linkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.⁴

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security outlined the field in theory and practice noting that Human security brings together the ‘human elements’ of security, rights and development. As such, it is an inter-disciplinary concept that displays the following characteristics: people-centred, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented.⁵

**Cattle rustling**

The Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa defines cattle rustling as the planning, organising, attempting, aiding or abetting the stealing of livestock by any person from one country or community to another, where the theft is accompanied by dangerous weapons and/or violence. This includes firearms and any other instrument made or adapted for shooting, stabbing or cutting or any instrument which when used for offensive purposes is likely to cause serious injury or death.⁶

**Disarmament**

The United Nations Secretary General in his May 2005 note to the General Assembly defined disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small arms,
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.\textsuperscript{7}

**Practical disarmament**

It is an approach dedicated to addressing the root causes and in particular the reasons why individuals possess SALW to ensure that once they are disarmed, they would not re-arm. The comprehensive process attempts to address poverty and cultural experiences that contribute to proliferation such as cattle rustling. Practical disarmament is a desired end point anchored on voluntary disarmament.

The concept of Practical Disarmament was first used in 1995 in the UN’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, reinforcing arms reduction efforts in response to the new phenomena of small arms possession by non-state actors. Basically, the concept of Practical Disarmament acknowledges the extensive and complex channels of SALW proliferation as well as the additional reality that these weapons are not only confined to conflict situations, but also afflict communities in peaceful times.\textsuperscript{8}

**Small arms**

Nairobi Protocol defines small arms as weapons designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles. Light weapons shall include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortals of less than 100mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons.

The UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms defines SALW as those weapons which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. Small arms are those weapons designed for personal use and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.\textsuperscript{9}

The definition specifies small arms as including; revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. Light weapons include: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank, recoilless rifles, portable launchers or anti-tank missile and rocket systems and mortars of calibres of less than 100mm. It is important to note that ammunitions and explosives are considered an integral part of small arms and light weapons.
2.1 Regional and International Instruments

The governments in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa established binding instrument in attempt to address the proliferation of small and light weapons. A number of such mechanisms have carefully been developed at the national, regional and international levels with the view of coordinating activities to address the problem. Specific implementation procedures are defined in each of the instruments with clear parameters for participation by other stakeholders.

As a regional institution with constituencies in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, FECCLAHA’s role and contribution is expressed in her Strategic Plan 2014-2018. Specific emphasis is underscored in creating awareness on SALW Protocols, Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and gender dimensions. FECCLAHA also plans to focus on South Sudan and contribute in designing appropriate interventions. The Global Week of Action against gun violence is incorporated within the Strategic Plan for purposes of facilitating joint advocacy.\textsuperscript{10}

At the continental level, the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons articulates a key and specific objective; ‘to promote a culture of peace by carrying out education and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW.’ One of the strategic orientations of the same document underscores the need to institute appropriate measures to engage and enhance the capacity of civil society to effectively participate in the design and implementation of initiatives to fight illicit proliferation of SALW at all levels.\textsuperscript{11}

Essentially, the AU Strategy on SALW provides an opening for FECCLAHA to tap into the opportunity offered to civil society. This would be in line with realizing the component on human security in her Strategic Plan. A formal partnership between FECCLAHA and AU Commission would be necessary. Pursuant to exploring the opportunity offered to civil society under the AU Strategy on SALW, FECCLAHA has the ability to reach out to the grassroots and make some positive impact.

As an intergovernmental body, the AU strengths leans more in providing policy direction. In terms of design and implementation at the grassroots, FECCLAHA possesses a comparative advantage given its broad constituency spread in ten countries. The organisation is better placed to sensitize individuals and communities on the problems associated with the proliferation of SALW.
It is also pertinent to highlight the fact that the AU in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities and regional bodies with SALW mandate, are committed to ensuring availability of resources for the implementation of regional and continental agreements on illicit SALW. In essence, a formal partnership with AU Commission would further leverage FECCLAHA in terms of resource mobilization, particularly through the endorsement of support based on the implementation process of the Continental Strategy.

The Member States signed the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Bordering States on 21st April 2004. Initial States Parties to the Nairobi Protocol were; Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Tanzania. Somali joined as State Party in 2005 and Republic of Congo (RoC) was admitted as the 13th Member State in April 2009.12

Among other objectives, the Nairobi Protocol was established to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of SALW in the sub-region. The Nairobi Protocol also seeks to promote cooperation at the sub-regional level as well as in international fora to effectively combat SALW problem, in collaboration with relevant partners.

The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Declaration, 2000) preceded the Nairobi Protocol. The Declaration gave a new impetus to addressing the problem and provided the requisite platform and political goodwill to combat the menace. To translate this strategic guidance into action, the State Parties developed a Co-ordinated Agenda for Action as well as Implementation Plan (Nairobi Secretariat, 2001).

The Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons unpacked the instruments into several key areas: stockpile management, record keeping, marking, collection and disposal; import, export, transfer and transit of SALW; tracing and brokering; public awareness raising and public education; legislative measures, operational capacity and mutual legal assistance (RECSA, 2005). The State Parties agreed to establish National Focal Points to coordinate the implementation process of the Nairobi Protocol and related instruments on SALW.

To oversee the implementation process of the Nairobi Protocol and initially the Nairobi Declaration, the Member States established the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA). As an intergovernmental body, RESA has juridical personality and enjoys diplomatic status.

Among the key milestone achievements made under the auspices on RECSA include the entry into force of the Nairobi Protocol in 2006. As per Article 23 of the Nairobi Protocol, entry into force would be 30 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two thirds of the Member States.
Notable progress has been made in the establishment of National Focal Points, National (NFPs), National Action Plans (NAPs), review and development of policies and legislation. Progress has also been made in the control and management of state-owned stockpiles. It is important to note that the numbers of SALW in circulation have been reduced. Awareness raising activities have contributed to the increase in the voluntary surrender of illicit SALW (RECSA, 2010).

In 2008, the Member States of Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation (EAPCCO); Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda signed the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa.\footnote{13}

The Protocol was to be implemented through a multi-disciplinary approach. The signing of the Protocol was the culmination of a number of activities that included research, drafting, validation and adoption of the Protocol by the respective Ministers in charge of security in each of the Member States.

The Protocol on Cattle Rustling was received across board as a comprehensive strategy that would address the problem of cattle rustling from a holistic approach. Essentially, full implementation would address regional security; reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Also, improve development specifically among the pastoralist communities of the most affected countries; Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

The other State Parties to the Protocol, though not affected by the problem of cattle rustling, signed the Protocol in support of the desired outcome to improve national and regional security. The republic of Somalia has been affected by the problem of cattle rustling but due to political instability, it has not been in a position to fully engage in the implementation process.

It was anticipated that the full implementation of the Protocol would to a large extent prevent cattle rustling, improve regional security, build a culture of peace and enhance social-economic development. The State Parties were convinced that the prevention, combating and eradication of cattle rustling require national and regional coordination, cooperation, exchange of information and other appropriate measures.

The State Parties also acknowledges that the problem of cattle rustling cannot be addressed from an enforcement perspective only. In this respect, the roles were clearly cut out for each of the stakeholders; community based organisations, civil society groups, regional intergovernmental organisations, the international community, the State Parties to the Protocol and other relevant agencies.

Pursuant to the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, RECSA developed Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament to respond to specific challenges posed both by armed conflicts and various forms of civilian armament. The Guidelines are cognisant of the different approaches and initiatives undertaken in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States to address the challenges of illegal armament.\footnote{14}
While the challenges to address illegal armament remains, there is dire need to persistently seek various approaches to address the problem. It is in this respect that the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament was developed with a specific focus to the physical removal of SALW and creating conditions that would diminish the demand and supply of illegal arms in an environment of human security. Hence, Practical Disarmament aims at preventing conflicts, strengthening the rule of law and promoting public safety and security.

From the aforementioned documents, a number of points emerge. One is the fact that FECCLAHA has key and specific roles to play in the implementation process of the regional and national instruments. As a regional church based organisation with a broad network stretched in ten countries, FECCLAHA’s role is that of public awareness creation and information dissemination on the dangers posed by illicit SALW.

Secondly, in terms of practical disarmament, FECCLAHA has the role of encouraging individuals to surrender SALW to destined state agencies through available networks and platforms provided by the church.

Thirdly, the organisation has to demand for accountability and transparency on the implementation processes, while urging member states to meet their obligations on the regional instruments. To accomplish these tasks, it would be in the best interest of FECCLAHA to enter into formal agreement with RECSA, African Union and EAPCCO in support of the implementation processes.

2.2 Conflict dynamics

The easy availability and access of SALW continues to exacerbate conflicts in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Over the past two decades, most of the countries in the two sub-regions have experienced civil or inter-state conflicts. The Sudan experienced one of the longest protracted conflicts with South Sudan demanding self-determination. In the process of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, South Sudan gained independence as the youngest nation in July 2011.

Political and economic gains made over the past two years in South Sudan were challenged by the violent conflict that broke-out in 2013 between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and factions allied to his former Vice President Riek Machar. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in January 2014 under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia has been violated through resumption of violent conflict worsening humanitarian situation.

Somalia instability has continued to affect peace and security in the Horn of Africa particularly because of the terrorist threats caused by the Al-Shabaab in the region. Kenya’s intervention through her Defence Forces (KDF) has left the country vulnerable and a continued target for terrorist related attacks. The country has also been recovering from the Post-Election Violence that rocked the country following
the disputed national elections of 2007. Among other parts of the country, Central Rift Valley was negatively impacted on by the proliferation of SALW.17

A prolific writer of Peace and Conflict Analysis, Johan Galtung, explains the three different types of conflicts; direct, structural, and cultural violence. He argues that, conflicts occur when different actors have incompatible goals and interests. Direct conflicts consist of clear causes, actors and cycle. Political related conflicts in the two sub-regions fall within the first category. This is based on the argument that the causes are often clear, the actors are known and the cycle of the conflicts also tends to follow a specific pattern and stages.18

Land and resourcebased grievances are known to be one of the thorny issues that if not ameliorated timeously leads to protracted conflicts. Burundi, Kenya and South Sudan are among the countries in the region where land remains a direct and in some cases, an underlying root cause of conflict. Structural conflicts relate to issues of injustice, lack or failure of constitutionalism, corruption and inequitable distribution of resources. Lack of tolerance and failure to accommodate other cultural values constitutes the third type of conflict. All these factors feature in most conflicts in the two sub-regions.

Comprehensive conflict study should combine the analysis of structures and actors, and how the two interact with one another. Structural analysis focuses on the institutions (political, social, and security) that may engender violent conflict. Actor oriented analysis involves a fine-grained analysis of individual incentives and motivations.19

Conflicts in the region form an intricate system largely because of geographic proximity of ethnic groups across the international borders. Porous borders that are not effectively managed also contribute to SALW flows across the countries and fuel conflicts over use of pasture and water amongst pastoralist communities. As SALW are easily concealed, the traffickers tend to follow the conflicts and recycle the stock piles.

Following the assassination of President Cyprien Ntaryamira along with his Rwandan counterpart, Burundi experienced intractable conflict for over two decades. Peace and reconciliation efforts led by South Africa restored stability though occasionally, the rebels failed to observe the peace agreement. The disputed elections of 2010 appeared to destabilize the country once more but continued peace and reconciliation efforts provide a beam of hope. To some extent, political instability and suspicion between the rebels and the government contribute to the demand and supply of SALW in the country as well as in the region.

Complexity of the Congo war deepened with the involvement of Uganda under the command of President Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda’s close ally at the time. Uganda’s explanation for joining the war was that Kabila’s government was not providing security along Uganda’s western frontiers. The other dimension which could be contested depending on interpretation is that Uganda government purposively planned and executed Uganda’s invasion in order to further the economic interests
of the state. Another economic argument about Uganda’s intervention in DRC was that Museveni ordered his army into Congo so that they could plunder for their own, personal benefit.20

Presumably, SALW employed in various wars in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa tends to move along the epicentre of high intensity conflicts. With porous borders and poor policing mechanisms particularly during war and conflict, both state and illicit SALW have continued to move across the states in the region. The only way to reduce demand and supply across the borders is to address the causes as well as resolving intractable conflicts that trouble this part of the continent.

Without painting a grim image of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, the armed violence, conflict and war experienced over the past two decades continues to generate SALW into circulation. A close analysis of each of the conflicts in the region reveals multiplicity of suppliers through regional state supply as well as international suppliers. In this respect, concerted efforts would be desirable towards addressing both ends of demand and supply.

The Congo war attracted suppliers from the African countries directly involved in the war or indirectly as conduits like in the case of Tanzania which allowed its territory to be used to facilitate the movement of arms and ammunition to the anti-Kabila rebels and their supporters. Former colonial powers; France and Belgium and the two contestants during the Cold War, former Soviet Union and the United States were also involved to supply SALW.21

Conflicts in the region impact negatively on women and children as well as men thus affecting gender relations. As stated by Skelsbaek et al, (2001), gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, norms, and so forth, which affect how both males and females, or rather how masculinities and femininities are defined or understood within society.

A gender relations approach examines the interplay between masculinities and femininities. While feminism increased the attention to gender-related issues, most notably in regards to females, more recent men and masculinities research has offered a complementary understanding of how gender and gender relations affect us all. 22

Armed conflict and violence has a negative effect on the lives and perspectives of women and men, girls and boys who experience and survive armed violence and war. Both women and men suffer from war that includes traumas, abuses and loss of control over and access to important resources.

The impact of these changes is experienced in different ways. As a result, gender inequalities are often exacerbated during periods of armed conflict. This mechanism continues during post-conflict reconstruction. A gender analysis of armed conflict and violence makes visible how these changes unfold and helps to assess the impact of those changes on women and men.23
3.1 Cattle Rustling

Cattle rustling have over the past few decades evolved from a cultural practice to become one of the greatest contributors to insecurity within Horn of Africa and to a lesser extent in the Great Lakes Region. The main reason being, traditionally, the communities used bows and arrows which have since been replaced by SALW. Violence applied in cattle rustling has been evolving from low intensity to high level as the raiders acquire sophisticated SALW. Commensurate to the high level of violence is the evolution of the cultural practice to a well-organized, coordinated and commercialized activity.

Factors contributing to the menace include restocking, protection of livelihood, cultural practices such as rite of passage, harsh climatic conditions, marginalisation of zones inhabited by pastoralists and the easy availability of SALW. Porous borders along Horn of Africa countries have compounded the problem of human security as the rustlers fiercely engage in cattle rustling using complicated SALW. The Kenya-Uganda-Sudan-Ethiopia-Somalia border regions are so awash with small arms that guns have become an integral part of bride price amongst the various ethnic groups.24

Propositions have been advanced regarding pastoralism and cattle rustling as an area most researched within the region. One such research indicate that the raiders often come in armies of 100 – 500 people and sometimes in thousands, thereby outnumbering the security forces. In such cases, overstretched government security personnel are unable to deal effectively with the raiders.25

While the problem of cattle rustling impacts negatively on human security, increases opportunistic gender related violence and fuels the demand and supply of SALW, there are specific zones that are more affected. Previous researches conducted in the region have identified the Karamoja cluster, the Elemi Triangle, the Somali cluster, North Rift Kenya and Moyale-Marsabit borders as the most affected zones.
The Karamoja cluster is a commonly used term employed to describe the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist ethnic groups, most of whom share a common language, culture and geographical location. The area straddles north-eastern Uganda, north-western Kenya, south-eastern Sudan and south-western Ethiopia. Among the prominent ethnic communities are Kenya’s Turkana, Jie and Pokot; Uganda’s Bokora, Pian Matheniko, Dodoth and Upe; South Sudan’s Didinga, Toposa, Inyangatom (Dong’iro) and Ethiopia’s Dassanech also referred to as Merille.26

The Elemi Triangle, also identified as a part of the Karamoja cluster, was once a disputed triangular border area between Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The area is significant for being a gateway to South Sudan, rich in unexplored oil reserves. It is also known for harbouring protracted and intermittent armed cattle-related conflicts. Such conflicts manifest themselves through incidents of raids, theft of livestock, a vicious cycle of revenge, rape and banditry. The end result is ungovernable regions, disrupted production and marketing of elemi dry lands’ products and utmost attracting very little domestic and indirect foreign investment.27

The Somali cluster includes Northern Kenya and the adjacent regions that are prone to insecurity, endemic cattle rustling and inter-tribal and clan clashes. These clashes encompasses Garissa, Wajir and Mandera; Tana River and Tana Delta Districts at the Coast. Northern Kenya, a predominantly arid and semi-arid region, also has a history of conflict and internal displacement. The main economic activity in the region is livestock rearing. The pastoralist communities that live in the region keep large herds of cattle, goats, camels and some donkeys.28

Along the border of Kenya and Ethiopia, ethnic hostilities are mainly amongst the Merille and Gabra. The complexity of the conflicts appears to be as deep as the differences amongst the communities. Reconciliation efforts have not yielded much due to revenge missions that are staged seasonally. The Borana versus Somali clan commonly known as Degodia also experience ethnic conflicts. Further to the south rift of Kenya along the border with Tanzania, the Maasai cluster pities the Maasai, Kuria and Kisii. Communities in the Maasai cluster have the tendency to use home-made weapons along with SALW.

To counter the menace caused by cattle rustling, two schools of thought have emerged. Some scholars and practitioners argue that pastoralism as a way of life should be discouraged as it fails to reflect much desired changes in development. In search of green pasture and water, the communities have to keep moving from one zone to the next. In the process, service provision to their livestock, schools, hospitals and other social amenities are not effectively provided hence slow economic growth and development.

Due to the reasons explained above, one school of thought argues that pastoralism should be eradicated. The second school of thought holds true that pastoralists have excellent coping mechanisms that ought to be fostered. This school of thought views pastoralism as a way of life with benefits that should be accrued along the proven coping mechanisms. To support this school, some scholars make the proposition that
pastoralism should be transformed into a profitable enterprise through the export of meat, hide, bones, etc.

### 3.2 Cultural practices

Social value systems that were traditionally practiced and preserved by most communities in the two sub-regions have been on the decline due to modernisation, urbanisation and technology. For instance, positive cultural values that emphasized rites of passage have been replaced by those with negative connotations such as moranism, a practice through which pastoralist youths express their masculinity as they engage in cattle rustling. Available means should be applied towards modernizing the practice through technology, entrepreneurship, commercial cattle keeping and tourism.

The need to modernise moranism need to be emphasized considering that some of the deep-rooted cultural practices impact negatively on peace, security and development. Both moranism and raiding as a means to acquiring herds of cattle for dowry, not only affects security but to a large extent enhances gender based violence. Young men who have to go through violence to acquire a bride are likely to have the wrong notion and mind-set of women as lesser entities in marriage relationship. It has been a common occurrence that women and children, particularly girls, receive the brunt of violence during cattle rustling incidences and violation of their rights.

As change agents, FECCLAHA and constituent members need to participate in restoring traditional value systems that played significant roles in fostering community cohesion and peaceful co-existence. In some communities, women tend to play dual roles of war mongering and peace makers. Hence, one of the approaches is through targeting mothers as change agents as well as motivating them to take their children go to school. Acquired knowledge and skills would transform negative cultural practices.

### 3.3 Value for affluence

Affluence and un-healthy competition for resources increasingly contributes to conflicts, exacerbates crime and negatively impacts on human security. The Horn of Africa countries is perceived to be rich in cultural values particularly Djibouti, Sudan and Ethiopia. The Eastern Africa region and the Great Lakes are generally viewed to attach value to affluence, acceptance of external influence on values system and tolerance to free market economy. These aspects tend to promote economic competition which comes with erosion of traditional value system.

To a large extent, one could also make a case that value for affluence has also contributed to corruption in the affected regions thus compromising security and
provision of services. Whilst East African countries have been affected by the brunt of terrorism, countries viewed to be having close control of the population and limited democratic space experience affluence to a lesser degree. Terrorist attacks have not been as regular as in countries like Kenya, which has a capitalist inclination, free economy and fair degree of insecurity.

At an incident that occurred in Addis Ababa, the respondent posed a question on what would have happened if a similar situation occurred in Nairobi, Kampala or Kinshasa. The following is an extract of the ‘story’ shared by the respondent.

An employee left a Bank in Addis Ababa with over USD 20,000 in Ethiopian Birr. The funds were to meet costs for a regional conference. The bag containing the cash was susceptible to damage by strong winds which actually scattered the notes…. The passers-by assisted in gathering the notes and stashing the Birr notes back in a more secure bag. What would have happened in Nairobi, Kampala or Kinshasa? Perhaps in a different capital, the passers-by would have helped themselves to the available free cash as opposed to offering assistance and gather the notes safely back into a more secure bag.

In most of the countries within the two sub-regions, the gap between the rich and the poor is convincingly wider than in the developed world. Those in power appear to enrich themselves with funds from public coffers. The situation is worsened by endemic corruption and misappropriation of resources that deny facilities and services to the citizenry.

Consequently, the cost of living continues to rise while inflation increases by the day. With the high rate of unemployment and the determination to put a meal on the table, some youths have ended up in crime whilst others are susceptible to radicalization and recruitment in terror groups.

### 3.4 Poverty

In some occasions, inequitable distribution of resources and high levels of poverty serve as a justification to armed violence. For most of the countries in the region, this challenge has been addressed through development projects geared towards alleviating poverty. Some form of occupation would keep away ex-combatants and child soldiers from engaging in violence and acquiring SALW as key tools of violence.
As a means to conflict prevention, it is important that FECCLAHA participates in the debate on youth empowerment and employment.

### 3.5 Societal Dynamics

Societal dynamics have been changing with the role of elders diminishing while that of the youth increasing. This could be explained in respect to the increasing youthful population while those senior in age are outnumbered. Modernity has also increased due to advancement in technology, levels of exposure and globalization. This explanation captures the proposition that the youth are more involved in violent conflicts and acquisition of firearms. Youthful leadership needs to be factored at the community level and politically.

Development in technology has continued to youthful millionaires unlike the traditional trend of accumulating wealth progressively from middle age to old-age or retirement. This new dynamic will probably present various challenges to the society. The youthful millionaires require guidance on investment and entrepreneurship. Also, concerted effort would be needed to ensure that the millions acquired through technology get well spent in self-development and benevolence funds. As opposed to supporting terror groups that could wilfully target and radicalize the youthful millionaires.

### 3.6 Armed Rebellion

Greed and grievances have been viewed as key factors contributing to violence among armed groups who rebel against democratically elected governments. The factions in South Sudan took arms against the government thus contributing to the proliferation of SALW. A similar scenario has been unfolding in DR Congo with M23 militia group which took up arms against the government. As in the case of the M23, they may have had valid reasons for taking up arms against a government that may not have honoured election promises. Resorting to violence and rebellion only worsens security, exacerbates conflict and increases the proliferation of SALW.

The post-election violence that engulfed Kenya following the disputed outcome of 2007 presidential elections led to demand and supply of SALW. In the counties most affected by the violence, the arms acquired at the time and in the run-up to the 2013 general elections could still be in circulation. Even though the country seems to be functioning under the new leadership and constitution, there are pockets of negative peace that need to be addressed for national reconciliation and healing. This would increase chances for voluntary surrender of arms in civilian possession and contribute to national security and community safety.

Post-election conflict resolution mechanisms in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa need to be established. This is important because in the near future,
several countries will be conducting national elections. A number of states have long serving presidents and the clamour for change might increase grounds for armed rebellion in Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, particularly if the incumbents offer candidacy as opposed to allowing new leadership. As discussed elsewhere in the report, it is necessary to also develop early warning mechanisms to monitor proliferation of SALW.

"Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan borders are awash with SALW."

4.1 Regional Perspective

“Small arms and light weapons remains a regional problem that is unlikely to go away soon.”
—Nathan - ICGLR

Amongst the pastoralists, inter-ethnic hostilities continue being a serious threat to human security. Communities take up arms to protect their livelihood. In such situations, the process of interpreting conflict dynamics determines resolution or escalation. While the role of the media is pertinent in reporting conflicts whenever they occur, some practitioners noted that once the information is in the public domain, politicians appear to take lead in interpretation and ‘subscription’ of solutions. In the process, political solutions are subscribed to conflict situations based on the politicians’ interpretation. Depending on the politicians’ political inclination, the interpretation might contribute to conflict resolution or escalation of hostilities.

It is on the above strength that the role of FECCLAHA is cut out in offering correct and informed interpretation, in an effort to end violent conflicts and to prevent SALW proliferation. Prominence of the church would be felt where FECCLAHA and her membership engage in interpretation of issues, actors and stages of various conflicts.

Several routes have been identified as the key avenues through which SALW easily move within the region. Sudan-Uganda route has been notable for SALW supply to the Karamoja cluster. A second route is the movement of SALW from Somalia into Kenya commonly known as north-eastern route. Through a different route, SALW move from Sudan into Lokichogion in Kenya. Yet another route is Karega-Lopoch-Kotido route.
A fifth route originated from Ethiopia connecting movement to Uganda via South Sudan. With the dynamics of South Sudan changing since the signing of CPA in 2005, this route has been on the decline. It is important to note that these routes are not permanent and are subject to change depending on the level of surveillance mounted by law enforcement agencies operating across the borders of this volatile region. Observations have also been made concerning law enforcement agents whose change of attitude is important to stopping the escalation of violence amongst pastoralist communities.29

Porous borders between the states in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa have increasingly favoured free flow of SALW from as far as North Africa. The increasing availability of arms has also provided aspiring militants with the opportunity to establish their own fringe factions. Weapons traffickers are also benefiting from the additional sources of supply and increasingly diverse selections of arms.30

States in the Horn have had unfriendly relations leading to the proliferation of small arms. Some of the ways through which states have expressed unfriendliness is by supporting insurgent groups. Neighbouring states tend to support insurgents opposed to incumbents. For instance, the Sudan supported the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) whilst Uganda supported Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). These factors contribute to political instability in the Horn and by extension they impact negatively on human security.

The epicentre of conflicts in Horn of Africa seems to have been Somalia for over a decade (1991-2000) until the formation of the Transition National Government (TNG) which contributed to stabilizing the country. Over the same period, the epicentre of conflict seemed to shift to the protracted civil war between the Sudan and South Sudan.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the two arch rivals seemed to open a new chapter with the implementation of the CPA and South Sudan’s self-determination. However, at the blink of a civil war and with the Cessation of Hostilities violated by the parties to the conflict, only time will determine how soon the youngest nation might enjoy sustainable peace and harmony.

The renewed hostilities in South Sudan are not a good indicator for the region. Early warning mechanism under IGAD was instituted with the objective of prevention and prompt intervention. Unfortunately, continued hostilities between the government of South Sudan and the rebels are a defining moment for the IGAD State Parties to reassess and re-evaluate the effectiveness of the established mechanisms.

In the Great Lakes Region, the epicentre has been shifting between Burundi, Rwanda and the DR Congo depending on the movement of rebels, militia groups and consequently SALW. Populations uprooted due to the civil wars have also tended to follow the epicentre pattern. Refugees moved from Rwanda during the genocide and then Burundi over the period of the protracted civil war. Also, refugees moved from DR Congo during the civil war to oust late President Mobutu Sese Seko with troops led by the late President Laurent Desire Kabila.
4.2 Burundi

4.2.1 Degree and level of proliferation

Burundi’s civil war of 1993 that ended in 2005 is largely perceived as one of the largest contributors of SALW. Some remnants of the arms that were in the hands of combatants during the conflict could still be in circulation today. However, the country has successfully transitioned into a post-conflict country, though it remains very fragile. It is one of the few countries that the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has been supporting since 2006.\(^{31}\)

According to a survey conducted by Small Arms Survey (2005), nearly 100,000 of Burundian households are thought to possess small arms. The proliferation of arms among the civilian population is mainly at the capital. To some extent, the provinces bordering Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are also affected and have considerable reservoirs of arms. During the civil war, Burundians may have drawn on these sources heavily and may well do so again if the domestic security situation deteriorates.\(^{32}\)

Even though disarmament efforts have been conducted in the country at different times, the recovery process may not have yielded to anticipated results of having a gun free country. However, through disarmament, at least 30% of the SALW in civilian possession have been systematically removed from circulation. The government led initiative of offering incentives such as cement and bicycles to motivate surrender only succeeded to some extent. The initiative faced challenges as the government
opted to provide the incentive items to the communities and left out the leaders. This factor hindered the leaders’ activities.\textsuperscript{33}

A presidential Amnesty granted for voluntary surrender was in force for about three months. Over the period, un-established number of SALW were recovered from civilian possession. Public education programmes were conducted ahead of the disarmament to ensure a smooth process. This led to positive results due to the partnership between the church affiliated groups, the media as well as the government administration.

The main objective for the government in conducting the disarmament initiatives was to mop-out SALW in circulation ahead of the May 2015 elections. In this respect, FECCLAHA and constituent members have a key role to play in conducting awareness programmes and persuading respective communities to surrender SALW in their possession.

The government has maintained close presence at the grassroots in view of enhancing peace and security. In some instances, the government has been accused of extra-judicial killings of dissidents accused of destabilizing the country. In an environment with dissenting voices and varying political opinion, it is possible for the ruling party to exercise high handedness against opposition. Civil society groups including FECCLAHA have a role to condemn extra-judicial killings and encourage political tolerance and respect human rights.

In different parts of the country, there have been fears that conflicts could arise as the country gets closer to the 2015 national elections. Political parties are likely to heighten tension and suspicion across the political divide thus negatively impacting the on-going peace process. Isolated cases of violence with key tools being SALW were already reported in different parts of the country.

To array fears, community policing has been reinforced. Members of the public have also been encouraged to participate in community safety and information sharing with law enforcement agencies. A pilot project on community policing was initiated at Makamba province and subsequently nationwide, to enhance security. It is anticipated that the initiative would contribute to reduction of SALW in circulation. Legal possession in the country is allowed on condition that the individuals follow the national law in the acquisition process. The military sets out the conditions for civilian possession of SALW.\textsuperscript{34}

The gains made in Burundi with regard to security and community safety needs to be consolidated. For instance, the country has been moving out of humanitarian assistance to self-development. As the country gears towards the May 2015 national elections, FECCLAHA and her constituency using the church platform need to preach peace, unity and reconciliation.

4.2.2 Root causes of proliferation, corridors and transit roots

Security concerns between Burundi and her neighbours have tended to dominate political debate due to flow of refugees and existence of rebel groups in foreign territory. Hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees have at various times
crossed to neighbouring Rwanda, Tanzania, and DRCongo. Also, some Burundian rebel groups used neighbouring countries as bases for insurgent activities.35

One of the corridors through which SALW have been penetrating Burundi is porous border with DR Congo. On-going conflicts in DRC have also impacted negatively on disarmament and arms reduction efforts as well as peace building in Burundi. The country suffered successive conflicts over the past two decades resulting to proliferation of SALW from government sources as well as from various factions opposed to the government. The volatile situation has been a cause of demand and supply of SALW.

4.2.3 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The DDR process in Burundi began with the Arusha Peace Agreement of 2003 and the integration of rebels into the government. It was important to commence the Reassertion as well in view of addressing political differences that would have continued impacting negatively on the peace process.

The National Programme for Disarmament Demobilisation, Reintegration and Reassertion (DDRR) led to the absorption of some of the rebels in the military while others were demobilized. The processes followed were to first identify the ex-combatants. Prior to demobilization, counselling the ex-combatants took place. To complete the process, the communities and local administration were also involved.

Ex-combatants who go through the process of DDRR are expected to form organisations that are zonal based. They are also accepted as partners in DDRR Programmes. It is important that both social and economic re-integration takes place so that the ex-combatants settle smoothly in the communities where they belong. Through sporting, cultural and economic activities, the ex-combatants find a platform to share and empower each other.36

4.2.4 Role of FECCLAHA

Government amnesty provides a window for voluntary surrender of SALW in civilian possession. FECCLAHA could play the role of encouraging civilians to take advantage of the amnesty to surrender arms in their possession.

In some parts of the country, there are no armouries for storage of government SALW. This factor could expose state owned SALW to theft or misuse. In support of stock pile management, FECCLAHA’s constituent members could solicit financial support for the construction of secure Armouries. The fundraising process could be through budgetary allocation or from development partners.

Community based organisations in Burundi have been making remarkable efforts towards enhancing peaceful co-existence among the citizens. One such organisation has been organising Peace Clubs in schools involving parents, teachers and students. According to the source, the strategy has been contributing not only to peace but also improving security and safety for the communities.37
Involvement of schools in search of peace and security should be replicated as a Best Practice not only in Burundi but other countries in the region that seem to be having periods of negative peace. As a regional organisation, FECCLAHA could adopt best practices and work with respective ministries in charge of education. This would be for the purpose of developing the materials and media required to support peace initiatives at the grassroots especially schools.

In a consultative approach, community based organisations have been assisting individuals at the grassroots with agricultural skills. Ex-combatants have been among the beneficiaries as a means of providing them with alternative livelihood and sense of purpose within the community.

Programmes targeting child-soldiers and ex-combatants have been rolled out in the country with the objective of enhancing quality of life through granting the individuals an opportunity to make a living in driving taxis or motor cycles. Women too have been involved in tailoring; they receive fabrics in support of the businesses. To maintain the momentum, FECCLAHA constituencies at the national level should support such initiatives and ensure they are sustainable for the greater good.

Burundi National Action Network on Small Arms (BUANSA) is made up of 34 civil society groups. This large number of organisations demonstrates commitment towards making some contribution in addressing SALW and improving human security. Most of these organisations are grassroots based. Therefore, they have access to first-hand information as far as proliferation of SALW is concerned. In consideration of the pertinent role they play in the community, they require strengthening.

BUANSA was established during the civil war in 2002, in response to the desire to improve security for the people of Burundi. It was motivated by the need to support war victims, amputees, orphans, widows and ex-combatants including child-soldiers. In addition, the network participated in community sensitization, education for peace, conflict prevention and voluntary surrender of SALW. The network has continued to work with respective communities in preparation of state organised disarmament activities.

“There are many SALW in circulation within the country contributing to a state of negative peace”
—Remark by BUANSA

FECCLAHA should establish a mechanism at the national and regional levels to improve the capacity of CSOs and empower them as a significant contribution in improving human security.
4.3 Ethiopia

4.3.1 Degree and level of proliferation

Ethiopia has a population of 80 million and about 50 million live in the countryside where most households and pastoralist communities possess firearms. These estimates were indicated by one of the respondents consulted. The remark collaborated and elaborated the degree and level of proliferation of SALW in the federal republic. According to previous research (Taddele & Kimani, 2011) in Ethiopia civilians have more weapons than the police and possess close to one third of the total quantity of firearms owned by the military.39

Armed resistance in Ethiopia has been an avenue for small arms proliferation given that there have been several such groups. Some of the groups are; Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Democratic Union, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ethiopian Peoples’ Patriotic Front (EPPF), Tigrin Democratic Movement (TDA), Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) among other smaller factions that fail to sustain their vision. The armed groups contribute to the proliferation of SALW and pose serious threat to state security. Subsequent governments in Ethiopia have made various attempts to deal with armed militia groups but the challenge remains unresolved.
Civilian possession in Ethiopia is restricted through registration. This could imply that through successful vetting, citizens may possess legally acquired firearms. It was not possible to verify this observation due to inaccessibility of government departments. In the absence of official records and data, the study did not establish the number of firearms in civilian possession though one of the respondents noted that civilian possession is high due to historical and cultural reasons. Some estimates suggest that there are 320,000 firearms in Ethiopia under civilian possession. According to these estimates, Ethiopia ranks 174 out of 179 countries worldwide in terms of number of firearms under civilian possession.

The total number of small arms in circulation within Ethiopia is unknown, but according to one of the respondents, there are millions of arms in the country due to the long civil war.

“There are millions of arms in the country due to the long civil war.”

In what appeared to be a contradictory position, another respondent observed that small arms do not constitute a serious security threat in Ethiopia. His argument was based on the fact that there is tight state control and small arms are not easily available for purchase. In addition, the respondent noted that there are no individuals locally producing small arms perhaps due to lack of knowledge and skills. To confirm this observation, research would be required to assess the extent and magnitude of locally manufactured and homemade guns in the country.

Poor stockpile management by respective regimes have also contributed to the proliferation. This factor relates to the regime change as most arms were not accounted for. Successive regimes faced serious challenges in stockpile management, as each new government created a new army. Disgruntled soldiers also sold arms to civilians for personal gain and subsistence. The Ethiopia-Eritrea war between 1998 and 2000 was another avenue that may have contributed to proliferation of state owned SALW into civilian possession.

In an effort to secure their livelihood, pastoralist communities have continued to acquire firearms. According to a respondent, arms possessed by pastoralist do not seem to pose any threat to the state. Hence, state machinery tolerates the practice amongst pastoralists. Possession of SALW by pastoralist has been caused by lack of adequate state policing. The communities feel threatened and they take up arms for self-protection. This sounds contradictory to the fact that the system of government is well connected from the federal state to the grassroots.
4.3.2 Root causes of proliferation, corridors and transit roots

The problem of small arms proliferation in Ethiopia could best be understood from a regional perspective due to permeation through the international borders. A number of active conflicts along the border with Ethiopia have been contributing to the proliferation. For example, the protracted civil war between the Sudan and South Sudan, the political instability in Somalia and pastoralist conflicts affecting northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. From a historical perspective past conflicts in the Horn of Africa have contributed to the proliferation of small arms over the years.

Historically and from a cultural perspective, the possession of arms has been tolerated by the state. The cultural practice of possessing SALW and the legacy continues from one generation to the next. According to one of the respondents, it is prestigious to show off guns at social events such as funerals and weddings. The same source intimated that arms are also used in revenge attacks if a member of the family happens to be killed by a neighbour or an individual from another community.

4.3.3 Best Practices on Pastoralism

One of the approaches applied by the state towards addressing small arms proliferation in Ethiopia was to declare amnesty and to encourage civilians to surrender firearms in illegal possession. It was not possible to establish the intervals of the amnesty and the number of SALW that were recovered voluntarily.

Debate concerning the sustainability of pastoralism as a way of life has been on the rise. One school of thought argues that pastoralism should be supported due to their coping mechanisms. Those opposed to pastoralism observes that the practice should be replaced by sedentary farming. The point of departure for those opposed to pastoralism as a way of life is the argument that it is not sustainable.

Preferably, modernisation of pastoralism should be effected due to frequent resource based conflicts particularly water and pasture. Pastoralists have good reasons why they have to move from one place to another as a way of life. It is also common knowledge

“We Ethiopians love guns, the urbanites, the pastoralists, sedentary farmers, rural society, etc. Every house hold in the country side feels comfortable if they have a gun protecting them, especially the marginalized groups. The gun is a matter of life and death.”
—Respondent
that they share resources with other communities when natural calamities strike such as famine.

Pastoralism as a way of life might need to be accommodated by local communities in view of reducing conflicts that drive the acquisition of SALW. One approach that has been employed in Ethiopia is the creation of common markets that have been established in view of eliminating middle men who take advantage and exploit pastoralists. The middle men acquire livestock at low prices only to sell them at much higher prices. Also, pastoralists have healthy perspectives on open sovereignty.41

4.3.4 Initiatives to address proliferation

In an attempt to control civilian possession, the state has made deliberate effort to register small arms. According to one of the respondents, the registration process has been under way for the past 15 years. Disarmament of pastoralist communities should constitute state agenda as continued proliferation does affect peaceful co-existence and impact negatively on development.

“The government of Ethiopia restricts and controls civilian possession of firearms through registration.”

Citizens have been participating in various media programmes as a platform provided for exchange of experiences, views and ideas on how to improve peaceful co-existence. In such gatherings, information is also collected on grievances affecting the communities. Once collated, the information is forwarded to the state, through the Ministry of Federal Affairs, for appropriated intervention and resolution. The forum and radio programmes would be useful in the campaign against the possession of SALW.

Ethiopia has a long history of religious tolerance through inter-faith dialogue. However, religious extremism and terrorism have affected objectives of peaceful co-existence. Through dialogue at the community level, religious leaders have been encouraging citizens to freely express themselves on the issues that affect peaceful co-existence.

4.3.5 Challenges and Opportunities

There is a law prohibiting Civil Society Groups involvement in security related matters in Ethiopia. Efforts to obtain a copy for close scrutiny did not bear fruit. However, a commentary on the Draft Law noted that the subject had become the most topical issue among the Ethiopian civil society. If the draft is passed into law, most Ethiopian civil society will be forced to confine themselves to relief and service
delivery, while advocacy will face total shut down. The draft law seems to be skewed towards control and sanctions rather than creating an enabling legal environment for Ethiopian CSOs.

This means that in Ethiopia, as matter of necessity, FECLLAHA will have to work closely with institutions recognized by the state, particularly EECMY, her constituent member as well as other faith based organisations such as Inter-Faith Council. Fortunately, the Draft law does not appear to have affected faith based organisations. According to Inter-Faith Council, the organisation enjoys a fairly cordial relationship with the state thus making their operations and activities more receptive at the community level.

Inter Faith Council of Ethiopia was established in 2010 and within a period of three years, it made a good impression in the society. It has presence within the 11 regions of the federal republic of Ethiopia. The need arose out of concerns that the peaceful existence in the country could be negatively impacted by international terrorism. A peace manual for use by the council in its campaign and advocacy work, proved successful in addressing negative perceptions. Indeed, it has been an effective tool of reaching out to the grassroots with a common purpose of religious tolerance and condemnation of terrorism

As an organisation set to promote and enhance peaceful co-existence, the council conducts dialogue forums where citizens share experiences and express views on issues affecting the community. Media outreach is another method applied by the council in providing a platform for the citizens to participate. Through radio programmes, citizens participate and contribute with messages of peace. To a large extent, the council has also been making contribution towards addressing religious extremism and terrorism.

The forums provide an opportunity for the council to identify grievances commonly affecting respective communities. Once collated, the council forwards the grievances to the government through the Federal Affairs Ministry to take the necessary measures. In some cases, the government has been able to address pertinent issues in a timely manner at the grassroots which otherwise would have caused a breach of the peace.

The council has also made contribution by developing a Peace Manual with common guidelines pertaining to issues affecting different communities. Even though written in Amharic, the principle is worth emulating in terms of developing guidelines relating to common issues within FECLLAHA membership. For instance, regarding human security, guidelines could be provided on the need to share information with authorities and alertness in identifying members possessing illegal SALW at various levels of the society.

In spite of the existence of the law barring non-governmental organizations engaging on security related issues, the Inter Faith Council as a faith based organisation is registered by the Ministry for Federal Affairs. This spells out the significance of the
Council which is exemplified through receiving government support. FECCLAHA constituent members should emulate the approach of cultivating good relations with the government for the purposes of contributing to peace and security.

4.4 Kenya

4.4.1 Root causes

Key factors contributing to the proliferation SALW in Kenya includes civil strife in neighbouring countries. In reference to Uganda, some of the arms looted from Moroto barracks by the Karamoja in Uganda following the fall of Idi Amin in 1979 ended up with pastoralists groups in parts of North Rift were not fully accounted for. The fall of Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia in 1991 also led to the inflow of arms into North Rift, Upper Eastern and North Eastern provinces. The collapse of Siad Barre regime in Somalia also contributed to proliferation in Kenya.43

Political instability in neighbouring Somalia has continued to negatively impact on Kenya’s security. Arms traffickers take advantage of the situation in Somalia to smuggle the weapons through the porous borders that are not effectively policed. With security threats posed by international terrorism, the situation is unlikely to improve until the government in neighbouring Somalia gains full control over various political factions and the Al-Shabaab.

The greatest ray of hope for Somalia currently lies with the joint Africa Union Mission in Somalia and of course the Kenya Defence Forces intervention to root out Al-Shabaab. The terrorist group have continued to pose the greatest security threat in the country with the most recent attacks at West Gate Mall on the 21st September 2013. The criminals massacred over 60 civilians using AK 47 rifles.Also, there have been subsequent sporadic attacks mainly in Mombasa and Nairobi.

Cattle rustling in different parts of the country have continued being contributory factors to the proliferation of SALW. As elaborated elsewhere in the report, cattle’s rustling is of greatest concern because of the level of violence encountered in the process of the criminal activity. Cattle’s rustling is also a cross-border crime that has been complicated by counter attacks staged by afflicted ethnic communities who seek to revenge instead of pursuing justice through the established judicial system.

While some Kenyans acquire small arms illegally, there are those who seek certification under the hand of Chief Licensing Officer. Those who apply and qualify possess small arms under stringent measures. Licenses are only issued to civilians to acquire small arms but not light weapons. However, among the licensees, some individuals may lose their small arms through robbery, misplacement or malpractice.

Disparity between the rich and poor has been increasing in the country and it is made worse by the high number of unemployed youth. The idle youth are vulnerable to recruitment into various criminal groups. Readily available SALW in most cities enable organized groups to engage in different criminal activities including armed
robbery and hijacking. This cause could be attributed to the country’s inability to create employment opportunities to thousands of youth who complete or drop out of school on an annual basis and they end up in an environment conducive to crime. In this respect, the need to address the proliferation of SALW in Kenya cannot be over emphasized.

4.4.2 Level of proliferation, corridors and transit roots

A recent research report approximated the number of small arms in circulation in Kenya to range between 530,000 and 680,000. According to the research findings (Manasseh et al., 2012, p. 21), the figures indicate an upward trend in spite of a number of disarmament initiated by the state. Some of the zones with an outright upward trend were found to be Mt Elgon and Rift Valley.

A number of avenues exist through which illegal SALW are trafficked into Kenya and out of the country to the neighbouring states. The Somali border with Kenya stands out as one of the hot spots of supply. From the border with Somali, the traffickers have supply routes through Garissa and Isiolo. Depending on demand, SALW are also trafficked through a triangular route from Somalia border to Ethiopia through Moyale and then back to Kenya. Border town centres documented as points of dispersion to Nairobi includes Mandera, Moyale, El Wak and Lokichoggio (Sabala, 2002 p. 38).

The porous borders and ineffective policing makes it possible for the traffickers to transport SALW discreetly into the city of Nairobi and other parts of the country. Police laxity has been an issue of concern as corrupt officers allegedly fail to execute duties. Some officers do not enforce the law and in the process allow traffickers to smoothly go through road blocks with their cargo undetected. Laxity goes with minimal surveillance that contributes to easy movement of SALW across the borders. Local monitoring mechanism need to be established to support government led initiatives.

Refugees have legitimate business near the camps and could work along with people of good-will in sharing information with authorities on those who traffic arms across the borders. Small scale traffickers use donkeys across the borders to traffic SALW. County Peace Committees should play significant roles in monitoring traffickers and sharing the information with government authorities. It is equally important to monitor ammunition purchasers as there are unconfirmed reports that some law enforcement agencies are responsible for the diversion of ammunition and arms.

Through the border with Uganda and South Sudan, SALW get supplied into the country and the same route is also used to supply across the neighbouring countries depending on demand and availability. Some of the SALW are reportedly trafficked from Torit-Eastern Equatorial to the Kenyan border with South Sudan and vice versa with supply from Somalia as applicable. By extension, Bungoma and Kitale counties have negatively been impacted on by SALW used during the Mt Elgon skirmishes. Through a recent research study by KNFP, It was established that
Somalia is perceived to be the main source of most arms in Kenya. Also, firearms are thought to come from Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan as well. The same report noted that SALW are concealed in cargo, dead animals, and charcoal or on individual persons.\textsuperscript{44}

The transportation of SALW is complex due to the porous borders as the traffickers move back and forth from Somali into Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Poor management of borders escalates the problem and makes it easy for transnational criminals to discreetly operate intricate networks through which they move the SALW across the borders. A new trend has emerged where Somalis are marrying the locals in some parts of North Rift for example in East Pokot. This new trend is likely to complicate the trafficking process and conceal detection from law enforcement agencies given that the new found ‘friends and family’ are likely to facilitate the transportation of SALW.

The eastern shore of the Indian Ocean encountered complex piracy incidences over the past decade. One of the contributing factors remains the easy availability and accessibility of SALW. Counter piracy programmes have drawn not only the African states but international players as well. The governments have to continually find ways of incorporating local communities in border management and provide some incentives in an effort to improve security.

4.4.3 Initiatives to address the proliferation of SALW

Multi-faceted approaches in controlling SALW proliferation have been employed in the country. The Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was established in 2002 with the core objective to coordinate national activities geared towards addressing SALW. In 2003, the first national mapping was conducted under the auspices of KNFP to establish the scope and magnitude of the problem.

Some of the achievements made by KNFP is drafting of a Policy on Small Arms which has since been revised and is awaiting presentation to the Cabinet. Also, CAP 144 of the Laws of Kenya on the Firearms Act controlling SALW has been repealed through the coordination of KNFP. In 2011-12, the KNFP undertook national wide research and published a report entitled; Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment.

“In Korogocho and Ngomongo, informal settlements located east of the Nairobi city, Children as young as 13 years are going to school with guns.”
—Respondent.
The report is a milestone as it provides a comprehensive study of the status of the country on the issues relating to small arms and how they affect the citizens. A number of recommendations made through the study would go a long way towards addressing SALW proliferation and related insecurity in the country and by extension the region, if effectively implemented.

In furtherance to the implementation of the UNPoA and the Nairobi Protocol, the KNFP through the support of the RECSA has marked over 60% of state owned SALW for stockpile management. It is anticipated that the marking would not only enhance stockpile management but also contribute to reduction of small arms in circulation.

The Kenya Police Reserves (KPRs) have been re-engineered to National Police Reserve (NPR) and a Draft Policy Framework to govern their operations has already been instituted. The main goal was to organize NPRs within a formal framework and support their performance. Previously, they were not closely monitored and without proper remuneration, some were allegedly misusing the state owned small arms either directly in crime or indirectly by hiring them to criminals and cattle raiders for a fee.

The Kenya National Focal Point has been working in collaboration with various partners to address the proliferation of SALW in the country. One of the ways utilized is to address gatherings in churches in the campaign against the illicit use of SALW. In partnership with FECCLAHA and her constituent members in the country, this collaboration would be broadened to reach out to many other citizens. This is also in line with the Nairobi Protocol regarding the pillar on creating awareness, sensitization and public education.

A number of civil society organisations were incorporated into the KNFP’s various working committees, upon its establishment. This factor has worked in favour of KNFP over the years due to drawing technical support and facilitation from local and international civil society groups. One of the informants representing a local organisation, who was interviewed in this study, noted that tactical collaboration with the state has enhanced initiatives as opposed to direct confrontation.

It is on a similar footing that Kenya has been participating in the Civil Society NGO Dialogue Forum mandated by the UNPoA Ministerial Conference Review of 2004. The Civil Society NGO Dialogue Forum is a partnership with other like-minded organisations involved in the SALW campaign dubbed Africa-China-European Union Dialogue on Conventional Arms Control involving RECSA region. This was a two year Project since 2012 and is set to end in June 2014; though an extension has been sought.

Essentially, the Dialogue Forum has been one of the achievements for RECSA region NGOs in collaboration with Chinese NGOs and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dialogue is important because it has provided a platform for collaboration on pertinent issues at the international level. For instance, during the
March 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Diplomatic Conference in New York, China abstained from voting to adopt the Outcome Document. Through the NGO forum, African NGOs have the opportunity to find out why China abstained from adopting the Outcome Document and express the likely impact of SALW proliferation in Africa.

At the international level, Kenya co-sponsored ATT and played a pertinent role in pushing the debate to the General Assembly. The ATT was negotiated since 2006; in subsequent years, Kenya has been participating in the Review Conferences every three years. Also, Kenya has been implementing the UNPoA and the Nairobi Protocol along other regional and international instruments. This has kept the debate in focus at the regional, UN and global levels as concerted efforts are required for successful SALW controls.

4.4.4 Disarmament

In an effort to address the problem of small arms proliferation, the government of Kenya has been employing different approaches. Initially, the state applied forceful disarmament particularly during the regime of retired President Daniel Arap Moi. A number of civil society groups pressed on the government to change tact as forceful disarmament violated human rights and failed to address the underlying root causes.

Since 2005, the state engaged in Practical Disarmament which involved provision of services and addressing some of the underlying causes of small arms proliferation particularly insecurity and lack of development. Operation Dumisha Amani (Sustain Peace) first phase began in 2005-06 which was inclined to Practical Disarmament. Voluntary disarmament followed in 2010 as the earlier process was interrupted by the national general elections of 2007 and subsequent skirmishes in 2008.

In an effort to dismantle Mt Elgon Sabaot Defence Forces (SLDF), Mt Elgon Operation Okoa Maisha (Save Lives) followed. Another initiative was conducted in Mandera dubbed, Operation Chunga Mpaka (Guard the Border). Kenya has also been involved in cross border disarmament with neighbouring Uganda and to a lesser extent, South Sudan.

4.4.5 Role of FECCLAHA

In view of changing student’s mind set, peace education is an important tool that needs to be considered in the curriculum. The key actors in the campaign against the proliferation of SALW need to work in collaboration with Kenya Institute of Education (KIE) and FECCLAHA. Such an initiative would help in identifying modalities of incorporating issues of security and creation of awareness on dangers caused by SALW to the benefit of students. As a regional organisation, FECCLAHA could replicate lessons learned from such an initiative to the other constituent members in her jurisdiction.
Regional coordination on matters regarding security remains a challenge not only for governments but also civil society groups. In this respect, FECCLAHA has the necessary network and platform to coordinate various activities nationally and regionally. One of the areas where FECCLAHA could play a pertinent role is the interface between CEWARN and her constituent members, particularly integrating early warning mechanisms and developing indicators for SALW proliferation.

Some of the core indicators include the actual trafficking and individuals visibly seen carrying small arms. A few individuals might have information of syndicates applied in the underworld of trafficking and supply of the guns. Upsurge in acquisition is another core indicator in areas where there is high prevalence of SALW such North Rift of Kenya and north-east of neighbouring Uganda. If individuals in both countries are seen carrying guns during peace times, this becomes an indicator that all is well and violent conflict could be in the offing.

Religious leaders need to invest time and make a difference that would yield into surrender of illegal guns. Most church leaders require training and access to a forum that would inform them about human security. Christians have confidence in their church leaders and hence wouldn’t hesitate to surrender illegal SALW to them.

Prophet David Owuor at a Crusade in Nakuru County, Kenya; firearms and ammunition were surrendered following the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence.
4.5 South Sudan

4.5.1 Root causes

The exact number of SALW in circulation in South Sudan could still be unknown due to the complexity and length of the civil war in South Sudan. It is estimated that there are over 3 million SALW in South Sudan out of a population of eight million as per the National Population Census conducted in 2010.

A different source suggested that there are over 50,000 SALW still in the hands of the civilians in spite of disarmament and voluntary surrender. The high estimates could be on the basis of the fact that SALW are easily available. A respondent noted that SALW are exchanged with 10 cows and to some extent, they are used as commodities of trade.

A number of challenges affect stockpile management in South Sudan including poor storage facilities, poor record keeping, and lack of a data base and tracing mechanism. Due to lack of storage facilities, the recovered SALW in some instances get back into circulation. Concerns have also been raised regarding civilian possessions of SALW which at times have been used against the law enforcement agencies.

Lack of state security contributes to acquisition of SALW by individuals and groups. It is common knowledge that pastoralists make use of SALW in self-protection. During the civil war, SALW changed hands across the various factions, among the individual rebels as well as from the Khartoum forces. The country slowly crept back into violence towards end of December 2013 and early January 2014. This was at point which rebel activities were reported to be on the decline and LRA had moved out of South Sudan territory into Central Africa Republic (CAR).

The recent ethnic hostilities were sparked by political crisis within the ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Tensions within the party had reached a boiling point in the days before the conflict erupted. The clashes quickly expanded in Juba and then beyond the capital. From the onset, while the fighting was sparked by a political dispute, it took on an ethnic dimension, with members of the Dinka and Nuer communities committing atrocities against one another in a spiralling cycle of retaliatory violence (Security Council Report, 2014).\(^{45}\)

During the field work in Juba, one of the respondents noted that proliferation amongst the civilians continued over the second half of 2013, thus posing a serious
threat to community security and safety. This could be viewed as a precursor to the ongoing conflict that broke out in December 2013. It is unfortunate that the violent conflict continues to undermine political stability and economic development that the country has continued to enjoy since it gained independence in 2011.

In Juba, there are several warlords and some possess 10 to 15 bodyguards fully armed. Rebels fighting the government contribute to proliferation. The other concern is that the communities in South Sudan have continued acquiring guns. For this reason, disarmament efforts have to be thorough, inclusive and comprehensive.

During the civil war, the Sudan contributed to the proliferation of SALW in South Sudan by arming some of the communities to fight SPLA. Similarly, SPLA armed communities in South Sudan to assist them fight the Khartoum government. Even though disarmament processes have been underway, there could be large numbers of small arms in circulation and unaccounted for.

Civilians have also contributed to the proliferation by joining rebel groups and after acquiring the desired weapons they desert without trace. Efforts to remove the SALW from circulation remain a challenge due to the transformative nature of the conflict in South Sudan. The country has also gone through ethnic hostilities that have continued to escalate violence, consequently driving the demand and supply of SALW.

In the past the communities used rudimentary tools in self-protection but this transformed into AK 47 as proliferation of SALW increased. The ethnic divide has dictated that loyalties do not go beyond the individual’s respective communities. This regrettable situation seems to have been cemented by the government administration units, which were curved out based along ethnic affiliations. This factor increases suspicion and ethnic hostility in the country, with the possibility of driving the desire to possess small arms for self and family protection.

From a historical perspective, the government of Khartoum neglected South Sudan. Hence the level of development was compromised while the three decade civil conflict compounded the problem of small arms proliferation. Absence of the government translated into lack of structures, negligence of governance and democratization.

Only in a few state headquarters there seemed to be some resemblance of development while community security lacked in most of the rural states of South Sudan. Pastoralist communities were marginalized and did not seem to experience the government’s presence. This is largely viewed as the genesis of insecurity and proliferation of SALW in the country.

Cultural dynamics have also contributed some degree of proliferation. For example, among most communities, the chiefs had authority on the subjects. Over the past decade, this position has been eroded by youth dominance. As youths acquire small arms, they tend to feel more powerful than the elders who previously asserted authority.

Among the Shilluk, Dinka and Nuer, young men have to pay dowry of more than 50 heads of cattle. This factor has over the years been contributing to cattle raid/rustling as the youth endeavour to raise the required bride price. Unlike traditionally when
the youths applied bows and arrows, the preferred tool of violence in cattle rustling remains AK 47.

The protracted civil war, emergence of factions and rebel groups competing for power and positions contributed to the proliferation of SALW. Ethnicity has been one of the factors negatively applied in the formation of rebel groups. Among the Shilluk, some rebels are reportedly integrated within SPLA. According to one of the respondents, the rebels possess skills in making guns using local materials, thus increasing the number of home-made guns in circulation.

The desire to increase the population of respective communities has led to the abduction of women and children in some areas. Essentially, the game of numbers contributes to gender and sexual based violence against women and young men who are forcefully abducted from their respective communities. Abducted women have to produce more children and increase the population. In particular they have to produce the boy-child who eventually participates in cattle rustling and community defence.

A respondent representing a faith based organisation expressed that the number of civilians holding guns in South Sudan is very high. One of the explanations provided was that that the civilians are not given any incentives towards the surrender of SALW and contribution to community safety. According to the source, incentives are only given to soldiers in terms of training, skills and funds for investment.

The respondent also recognized the fact that the population of the civilians is far much higher than that of the soldiers. Hence, providing incentives to civilians would be way above available resources. However, faith based organisations like FECCLAHA could highlight the need for individual contribution to human security for the greater good of the communities. Once individuals appreciate their role and contribution, the benefits accrued in peace and development will be realized at all levels.

Corrupt government officials contribute to SALW proliferation as some of them allegedly sell their official firearms to civilians. The government has been making every effort to ensure that salaries are paid on time. This remains a challenge due to the huge amounts required. Financial constraints have also contributed to the delay in constructing armouries for safe storage of the firearms. Essentially, South Sudan requires reconciliation and healing to enable the government perform and meet all its obligations to the citizens.

4.5.2 Proliferation, corridors and transit roots

The long civil war in South Sudan has continued being a key contributing factor to the proliferation of SALW. War heritage resulted into thousands of SALW easily available from SPLA/M mobilized soldiers during the civil war with the Sudan. The north was also a source of proliferation through the support offered to the rebel groups to destabilize various factions in South Sudan.

Further, the serious status of SALW in South Sudan has been attributed to a cocktail of problems stretching from the prolonged civil war against the Khartoum government to conflicts and factions within Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). Some
of the factions armed civilians to protect themselves during the civil war with the Khartoum government. The other contributing factor is the porous borders with the neighbouring DR Congo, Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan’s Darfur Region where SALW flow in and out of the country.

Trans-border movement of SALW across South Sudan through international border with Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia continues to be another level of proliferation. The Elemi triangle has been an easy route enabling the free flow of SALW across the region. Pastoralist inhabitants freely move across in search of water and green pasture, whilst they use or acquire small arms to protect their livelihood.

The third level of proliferation is the localized South Sudan and Sudan circulation due to poor stockpile management by the police and the military. This has been compounded by the fact that the protracted civil war offered grounds for movement of SALW across their common borders.

Among other factors contributing to the proliferation of SALW has been the operation of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) inside South Sudan territory. Contribution of LRA to the proliferation could be understood from different perspectives. In an attempt to counter the aggression of LRA, a vigilante group dubbed Arrow boys was formed. The main objective of the Arrow boys was to protect the community against attacks staged by the LRA.

From a security perspective, the military was also involved in frequent patrols in LRA affected areas. Activities from the LRA, vigilante group and military contributed to demand and supply of SALW. Subsequently, the decline of the LRA activities in the country led to less demand of small arms.

According to views expressed by a respondent, the presence of LRA was so adverse, that when the group retreated to CAR, a period of peace and stability was experienced by the South Sudanese citizens and some of the youth involved resumed schooling.

4.5.3 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

Initiatives to address conflict and proliferation of SALW among civilian population have in most cases taken a multi-faceted approach. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in partnership with the government, nongovernmental organisations have been collaborating on Armed Violence Reduction Programme (AVRD).

Recovered SALW from civilians are stored by the police pending disposal. However, one of the respondents observed that some of the serviceable firearms are recycled by the police due to shortage in supply. The government has tight financial obligations to purchase sufficient firearms as required by the officers. Therefore, some of the serviceable SALW are assigned to some officers.

Disarmament is a multi-dimensional process which should also seek to transform the mind-set of the communities. One of the ways of tapping into community
participation is through demonstration of the negative impact of SALW to the community. The government of South Sudan does not have the capacity for national disarmament considering the various priorities and particularly infrastructural related. A government officer interviewed admitted that the police lack capacity to effectively conduct civilian disarmament. This could explain the rationale for SPLA’s involvement in disarmament in support of the police who lack the capacity.

During the marking exercise conducted throughout the country, the team in charge noted that some of the soldiers failed to turn-up for the exercise. Presumably, the firearms assigned to the officers were not marked and hence could not be entered into the official government data-base. Armouries are not readily available and some of the soldiers and police have to take the weapons with them for safe storage. It was not possible to establish the number of the soldiers who did not turn up for the exercise as the records were not readily available.

Generators are needed in different parts of the country to ensure that such an important exercise like marking of SALW does not get hampered by lack of power. One of the contributions that FECCLAHA could make is to collaborate with other stakeholders in the provision of temporary storage facilities that are secure for surrendered SALW.

Faith based organisations are trusted custodians by the communities. Involvement of faith based organisations would be a guarantee to the communities that surrendered firearms are secure and would not be returned into circulation by corrupt officers. The government needs to be prevailed upon to provide armouries at proximate distances as required by the armed forces.

A respondent estimated that the number of soldiers who have gone through DDR programme would be between 200,000-300,000 soldiers. Even though it was not possible to establish the period of time the DDR programme was implemented, for purposes of discussion, assumption is made that the period in which the soldiers were involved in the DDR was since the signing of the CPA in 2005. The DDR programme could be deemed fairly successful given the high number of those disarmed as referenced above.

Also, the government has been keen to promote and enhance national healing. It is on this note that the government granted amnesty for voluntary surrender continuously for 3-4 years. Efforts have also been made to strengthen cross-border small arms control – DDR and community security between the Sudan and South Sudan. The state has to work closely with all stakeholders and in particular civil society and community based organisations towards addressing all aspects of proliferation

4.5.4 Alternative means of livelihood

Cattle rustling remain a big challenge in South Sudan and a driver to the demand and supply of SALW. The youth move around during the dry season as they seek pasture and water. Due to the climatic conditions, cattle rustling have become a perennial problem that requires multifaceted solutions. It is important that the problem is
addressed by availing opportunities to the youth through vocational training so that they acquire some skills that would lead to alternative means of livelihood.

Among other possible solutions, the government should encourage investors to participate in commercial ventures that could assist pastoralist to make economic gains out of their livestock. For instance, a milk processing plant should be constructed to process dairy products for the local and regional markets. In regions that are endowed with favourable climatic conditions suitable for farming, food processing could be another field that might contribute towards uplifting the lives of the South Sudanese people.

The EAC countries should allow goods from South Sudan to be traded as duty free products. To achieve this objective, appropriate measures should be made within EAC countries to exempt taxation of South Sudanese products and guarantee tax holiday for at least a decade to the benefit of the country.

4.5.5 Initiatives to address SALW

The Small Arms Commission is the principal institution with the mandate to coordinate initiatives to address small arms proliferation. A number of initiatives have been undertaken by the Commission towards small arms control. In stockpile management, the Commission has taken lead in the creation of a data base of SALW possessed by the state law enforcement agencies. Specific data captured on each weapon includes; model, type, calibre, state and year of manufacture. From a government source, it was confirmed that over 42,000 SALW had been marked by November 2013.

Details for each firearm serve as a guide to determine for instance, the total number of SALW in state possession and identification of those that are obsolete. The details would also guide and determine future procurement. From a strategic point of view, the database is set to contribute significantly towards regular monitoring of uniformed officers particularly in view of increasing transparency and accountability in handling SALW. Essentially, the weapons control programme shows that the state understands the need to be proactive towards addressing the menace caused by SALW.

Improving storage facilities has been another area requiring attention by the government of South Sudan. Due to shortage of standard storage facilities, in some parts of the country, medium term storage mechanisms have been created. In affirmation of the old adage that ‘need is the mother of all innovation,’ sea containers have been modified to serve as armouries for storage. This is mainly for the purpose of ensuring that recovered and obsolete SALW are secured at low cost and in an effective method.

With the support of UNMISS, the Commission has been involved in training officers on marking and record keeping. The main objective remains the establishment of a data base for SALW. A data base has been established consisting SALW on the hands of the police, prisons, military, etc. It is anticipated that the initiative should contribute towards computing manual records and creating new database where none existed.
Small Arms Bill has already been drafted under the leadership of the Commission. As a constitutional requirement, the Bill has to be subject to a legal process through the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Interior will then finalize the process and present the Bill to parliament for legislative debate. Even though the time line for the process was not clearly established, the final stage was confirmed to be presidential assent.

Successful initiatives have been reducing the demand and supply of SALW. An example is UNDP’s Community Security and Arms Control Project (CSAC) which essentially involved supporting communities in respective regions. In the course of implementation of the project, police stations were constructed at the request of the communities. Through the Project, county governments also received support that provided a platform for interaction with different communities for purposes of consultation and inclusive leadership approaches.

Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, it was anticipated that there would be less demand of SALW. However, time has proved this underlying assumption wrong. In the absence of appropriate mechanisms of disarmament, civilians retained their small arms whilst the armament process continued with acquisition of new ones. This could be blamed to ethnic and political tension that did not cease with the signing of the CPA.

However, the South Sudanese people remain optimistic that the culture of violence that gripped the citizens during the long civil war would gradually be replaced by an environment contributing to peace and development. A respondent noted that one of the approaches that could be adopted to establish a culture of peace is to mould a new generation of South Sudanese children exposed to other cultures in Africa. This could be achieved through facilitating the children to interact and appreciate other cultures during exchange visits. To some extent, such envisaged exchange visits would lay the foundation of a new generation and a culture of peace.

4.5.6 Role of FECCLAHA

South Sudan has suffered one of the longest civil wars in the recent times resulting into a generation that has experienced the brunt of conflict and violence. Hence, healing and reconciliation amongst the different factions, is an important contribution that FECCLAHA needs to focus on. Messages underscoring the benefits of peace and atrocities of violent conflict need to be packaged in the simplest form possible for the communities’ consumption.

The advantage of opening the political space to allow democracy, governance, transparency and accountability was underscored by several respondents. Conducive political environment would prevent flare up of violence experienced towards end of 2013 and early 2014. FECCLAHA as a faith based organisation should make contribution through her constituent member, the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC).

Indeed, FECLHA has leverage to constantly remind the government of its responsibility in guaranteeing peaceful co-existence amongst the citizens, political
factions as well as with the disciplined forces. One avenue for FECCCLAHA to deliver her message would be through issuance of Pastoral Letters and media statements.

Communication space too needs to be opened especially through radio system so that the communities may be in touch with economic, political and global realities. Availability of information and free media has largely been hindered by insecurity. This is why regional and international actors have to focus on the plight of the South Sudanese people grappling with the quest for peace and development. Among other civil society groups, FECCCLAHA and her constituent members have to continually play advocacy role while demanding that the state guarantees human security as a basic requirement.

FECCCLAHA has leverage in South Sudan given that communities trust faith based organisations. In this respect, FECCCLAHA should take advantage in promoting peaceful coexistence. It is easier for communities to embrace reconciliation and adhere to the guidelines offered by FECCCLAHA and constituent members as faith based organisations. For instance, awareness creation is required towards establishing ‘gun-free water wells’ in order to reduce ethnic hostilities and to prevent conflict.

The umbrella body for civil society groups known as South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) has been actively involved in the development of the Small Arms Policy as well as the disarmament process. Contribution made by SSANSA also includes the coordination of Security Dialogue Forum and advocacy for a security conscious constitution. FECCCLAHA and her constituent members in South Sudan needs to establish a close working relationship with SSANSA in view of consolidating the efforts made towards improving community safety and human security.

In partnership with her constituent members, FECCCLAHA could participate in national healing. South Sudan has been through a protracted civil war for about three decades. A National Committee for Reconciliation constituted by President Salva Kiir Mayardit under the leadership of Bishop Taban Parideh as the Chair is expected to play a pertinent role in the process.

Faith based organisations along with other stakeholders have a responsibility of uniting the different communities in the country against a common enemy, that is the gun culture. Essentially, rules of engagement for different stakeholders should to reduce instances of conflict or competition in the process of fulfilling respective mandate. FECCCLAHA has a role to play towards national healing and reconciliation together with other actors in peacebuilding.

To realize South Sudan Development Plan 2013-2018, a master plan document that outlines the priorities within the next five years, the country requires manpower development through training and acquisition of new skills. Development partners and aid agencies are greatly required to support the country in realizing its holistic potential.

For the above reason, FECCCLAHA needs to make deliberate effort to maintain the agenda of South Sudan on the radar through advocacy and issuing Pastoral Letters.
This is an important contribution for regional and international institutions to incrementally allocate resources in support of the continent’s youngest nation.

Government institutions require resource allocation and capacity building, particularly the judiciary for the purposes of realizing the Rule of Law. According to one of the respondents interviewed in Juba, there is an acute shortage of judges and hence the international community could support the training of judges at the local universities. FECCLAHA’s role in advocacy and awareness creation would help in information dissemination.

Considering that most communities traditionally had Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), it is important that such mechanisms should be incorporated within the judicial system. Traditional mechanism of justice should be considered in the judicial system in view of appreciating grassroots contribution to peaceful coexistence. FECCLAHA could make contribution through her constituent members in South Sudan to foster ADR processes and through her network, draw best practices from the regional states.

The same way UN Peace Keeping forces have been deployed in South Sudan, so also should the country work towards contribution of forces when required within the continent or internationally. Involvement in peacekeeping missions would be an opportunity for SPLA to embrace lessons learned from other parts of the world.

The need for SPLA/M to re-invent itself featured during the filed study. A few respondents noted that SPLA/M should have identified a different name as opposed to a title largely associated with the civil war with the Khartoum government. Upon ascending to power, SPLA/M retained their old name, perhaps with nostalgia. However, as a way of moving forward and being identified as a government interested in reconciliation and healing, the name change should be considered.

According to the sources, such a move would contribute towards increasing the citizens’ confidence in the military. The other dimension would be national healing from past atrocities that might have occurred during the protracted civil war. With a reconciliatory approach, FECCLAHA and constituent members perhaps could take lead in the campaign leading to the change of name and to reflect the status of the newest state in the international system.

4.6 Uganda

4.6.1 Root causes

Over the years, a number of factors have been contributing to the proliferation of SALW in Uganda. The two decades following independence were marked by political instability that could largely be blamed to poor leadership. A case in point is during the reign and over overthrow of Idi Amin, Ugandan soldiers fleeing from the barracks looted SALW. Whilst some of the SALW might have been recovered, some remained in illegal possession and have not been accounted for.
The process of political instability led to the proliferation of SALW from government sources to civilian possession. The current regime under President Yoweri Museveni ascended into power through armed struggle that also left behind a trail of accounted SALW.

Provision of security by private companies to some extent continues to contribute to SALW proliferation in the country. There could be as many private companies in Uganda as there are in Kenya but there is a difference in that the latter does not licence small arms to private companies providing security whilst most guards in Kampala have firearms.

In response to a candid question put to a private taxi driver who drove the Consultant from the Airport to a Hotel in Kampala, he remarked that ‘there is an armed guard at every other corner in Kampala city.’ This is a fact that foreign visitors quickly notice security guards visibly carrying firearms.

It would be interesting to find out how effectively the private companies manage firearms licensed to them and to ensure that the guards do not misuse them in crime or put them into private use. However, an earlier research on SALW proliferation found that licensing of firearms for use by private security companies also contributes to the proliferation of firearms used for criminal purposes.46

“In an armed guard at every other corner in Kampala city.”

In addition to the reasons stated above explaining SALW proliferation in Uganda, the other major source has been cattle rustling experienced in different parts of the country and especially Karamoja. The region is located in the north eastern part of the country and it is made up of the Districts of Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit.

The communities neighbouring Karamoja are major victims of rustling activities. These communities are mainly from Acholi, Lango, Teso and Mt. Elgon regions. As the insurgency activities of LRA intensified to Teso regions, the Government recruited militia groups from ex-servicemen and army reservists to supplement the army in protecting people and their property. Some of them supplemented the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) to form buffer zones along the borders with Karamoja to tackle cattle rustling.47

Cattle’s rustling in the region has been a major threat to human security particularly because it also has an element of cross border crime with South Sudan and north-western Kenya. Due to the magnitude of the problem in Karamoja, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) was deployed by the state to apply voluntary as well as forceful disarmament.
4.6.2 Proliferation and transit roots

Domestic reasons could largely explain the extent of the proliferation of small arms in Uganda. The country has not had effective procedures of handling state owned stock piles. With such loopholes, some law enforcement agencies lose their official small arms through theft or misplacement. Lack of procedures for the identification and destruction of obsolete, seized and surplus firearms have also been contributing to the proliferation, (KNFP). 48

In addition to armed conflict in northern Uganda including the Karamoja region, competition of resources with pastoralist communities from neighbouring countries particularly DR Congo, Sudan and Kenya contributes to proliferation of small arms. The traffickers and traders supply pastoralist communities with required firearms for use in counter attacks.

A national assessment conducted under the auspices of the Uganda National Focal Point (UNFP), the law enforcement officials indicated that there is trafficking of small arms along Sudan-Uganda border. The same report postulated that there are trading routes stretching from Southern Sudan to the Kenya-Uganda border. The other route mentioned is from Somalia and Ethiopia via Kenya (UNFP).

4.6.3 Initiatives to address proliferation

Concerted efforts are necessary for effective small arms control across the borders with the neighbouring countries and eradication of the existing regional routes. To address the problem of small arms proliferation and to improve human security, the government of the Republic of Uganda undertook disarmament through comprehensive development frameworks such as Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP).

The KIDDP involved UPDF, Agriculturalists, Veterinarians, Politicians, CSOs, NGO support Police Currently – RELOKA project – Re-establishing law and order in Karamoja with objectives of promoting conditions for human security and recovery in Karamoja regions and her neighbours. In addition, more than 1500 police officers were deployed (Ruteberika, 2008, p. 20).

A number of factors could be attributed to the success and sustainability of KIDDP Project. The government of Uganda initiated KIDDP but worked with civil society groups and development partners to make it a success. In addition to allocating resources, the state also established a Ministry to roll out the Project and assigned staff. Under the leadership of Janet Museveni, Minister for Karamoja Affairs, the staffs have been involved on a daily basis to ensure the Project succeeds.

One of the informants expressed that it is now very safe to visit Karamoja unlike in the past when the region remained a no-go-zone. The full potential of the region has also been realized with infrastructure development, agricultural activities and commercialized livestock keeping. Indeed, this Project is worth replicating in other countries that are affected by perennial challenges relating to cattle rustling and the attendant problem of small arms proliferation.

Since the current regime took the reins of power in 1986, a number of operations were conducted with the intention of restoring law and order in different parts of the country that were affected by armed rebellion. The Teso armed conflict of 1980-1985 was caused by Karamoja livestock raiding. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebellion started in 1996 in protest of the presidential elections that they claimed to have been marred by gross malpractices.

The government undertook a military operation to address the armed rebellion in West Nile Region of Arua District in 1997. In 2002, the government launched Operation Iron Fist against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in northern Uganda. A collaborative offensive was launched by the governments of Uganda, Sudan and Congo to disarm and demobilise LRA under the Operation Lighting Thunder of 2009. It was largely successful as it significantly weakened the LRA’s command structure (Muhereza, 2011pp. 27-43).

In attempt to mop-out SALW in illegal circulation, the government made several attempts to implement DDR programmes. The expected outcome of DDR processes in the country does not appear to have yielded the desired results. Previous researches attribute proliferation of SALW to poorly implemented DDR programme targeting
former combatants and the national army. According to the research findings, some ex-combatants retained their weapons after they were demobilized.⁵⁰

Each of the operations undertaken by the government of Uganda was meant to address armed rebellion and consequently the proliferation of SALW. To some extent, the government may have quelled the armed rebellion but on the contrary, SALW remained largely in circulation as the rebels sought new stock piles to fight the government forces. The government of Uganda thus faces a daunting task to make unrelenting initiatives to reduce and finally eradicate illegal small arms in civilian possession.
5.1 Democratic Republic of Congo

DR Congo is endowed with rich natural resources which have been viewed more of a curse and less of a blessing largely because of the protracted conflicts experienced in the country for decades. From the Belgian colonial rule to post-colonial independence regimes, DR Congo encountered internal and external wars. As if in succession, the country has been moving from one conflict to another with periods of stability but in an environment of negative peace.

As in many other Africa countries, former Zaire put up an armed resistance against metropolitan Belgian rule. This occurred during the cold war period that also contributed to armament in the DR Congo during the conquest between forces allied to the United States of America and the former Soviet Union. At the time, disarmament was not a priority and the arms acquired at the time remained in circulation.

A number of internal squabbles and conflict involving militia, rebels and insurgents within the country during the successive regimes have been key contributory factors to the proliferation of SALW. Immediately after independence, the country experienced political upheavals under the first regime. Within a week of independence, the new nation was held hostage by a Congolese army mutiny. The violence had set in motion a dangerous and disappointing post-independence trajectory (McCalpin J.O., 2002, pp. 33-50).

Political instability and violence marked the first years of independent in Zaire as the country was known at the time. President Mobutu Sese Seko restored order and stability for over two decades up to the end of the Cold War. Western powers began to pressurize the autocratic leader to implement political and economic reforms. In subsequent years, Mobutu’s regime was to later crumble over a myriad of crisis including the refugee problem caused by the Rwanda genocide of 1994.

President Laurent Kabila led a youth militia group that evolved to a formidable force dubbed Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) that ousted Mobutu’s regime in 1997. This happened with the support of neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Angola. As the troops advanced towards the capital, Kinshasa from the east of the country, some members of Mobutu’s army deserted the barracks. The chaotic environment laid the foundation for the proliferation of SALW in the country and the Great Lakes region.
Scholars and political analyst dubbed the conflict that oust Mobutu’s regime as the first Congo war. Political instability and upheavals continued during the tenure of President Kabila who survived a coup attempt but not assassination. With the support of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, Kabila fought the second Congo. Kabila also receive military support from Chad and Sudan.

The war began in 1998, with a mutiny at Goma led by Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) supported by Rwanda and Uganda to remove President Kabila from power. The involvement of these countries in the second Congo war led to an intensification of local conflicts and general proliferation of arms causing far reaching effects. A case in point is when the two allies; Uganda and Rwanda in support of the rebels opposed to Kabila turned their guns against one another and fought at Kisangani.\(^{51}\)

DR Congo continues to grapple with SALW that remained in circulation over the years. Armed groups have also been mushrooming and continue to pose serious security threat to the country. The M23 movement was formed by veterans of recent armed conflicts in DRC and neighbouring Rwanda, and particularly by members of DRC’s close-knit Tutsi community in North of Kivu Province. M23 refers to the peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 between the Kinshasa government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). There are other armed groups operating in different parts of the country and making use of different types of SALW such as Mai Mai Kifufua and Mai Mai Simba among others.\(^{52}\)

Easy availability and proliferation of SALW in Congo continue to impact negatively to state security, exacerbating conflict, and increased acquisition of small arms among the civilian population, refugees, armed groups, gangs and private security companies operating in the country. In the recent times, mediation efforts have been underway between M23 and the government of DR Congo under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Similar initiatives require to be undertaken by national, regional and international actors towards addressing the simmering conflicts and for the sake of peaceful coexistence.

### 5.2 Eritrea

Eritrea’s long war of independence stretching three decades with Ethiopia ended in 1991. This was a key factor contributing to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. Hardly did the dust settle than another battle front was opened from 1998 to 2000 over the border with Ethiopia.

The inter-state war between the two neighbouring countries attracted the attention of the international community. In May 2000, the United Nations Security Council imposed an Arms Embargo against the two countries. President Vladimir Putin banned Russian Federation arms export to the two countries in August of the same year.

Since gaining independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the country continues to be under one party rule, People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). President Isaias Afewerki has been accused of failing to implement democratic reforms.
Consequently, the country has been militarized due to the nature of the violent war of independence followed by the border conflict with Ethiopia.

Political and military defections have been reported and tens of thousands of soldiers have been seeking asylum in the neighbouring Sudan and Ethiopia. The situation is likely to worsen with Eritrea’s failure to exercise good neighbourliness particularly with Ethiopia and Sudan. Both countries accuse Asmara of harbouring insurgents opposed to their respective governments.

Relations with Somalia have also attracted suspicion from neighbouring states over the possibility of supporting armed groups poised to cause terrorist attacks. The allegations advanced against Eritrea paint a grim picture of a country that has been militarized from previous wars. Current situation in the country might deteriorate due to availability of small arms and light weapons that are in circulation. Internal and external pressure for democratic space could also mean massive recruitment of more soldiers and mounting resistance from the citizens.

The situation in Eritrea requires close monitoring particularly with regard to proliferation of small arms and light weapons. FECCLAHA and constituent members based in Asmara in collaboration with regional and international players have a responsibility to remind the current regime of the need to open up democratic space.

The current global trend particularly in North Africa and Middle East has demonstrated that change is inevitable. Where change has been denied, violent means have been adopted with SALW being the weapons of choice. This would mean more turmoil in the Horn of Africa country that might be on the verge of collapse.53

5.3 Rwanda

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Rwanda could best be understood within the realm of complex conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Similar to the case of the DR Congo, Rwanda’s armed groups, refugees and political instability provided grounds for armament. Civilians also received arms to effectively support either side of the political divide during the internal conflicts.

Particular mention should be made on the manner in which Rwanda Patriotic front (RPF) ascended into power through a militarized operation with the support of Uganda. This was a political gesture meant to reciprocate previous assistance provided by RPF during Uganda’s civil war of 1981-86. Uganda’s Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) allowed RPF to take stocks of arms to fight the war against Juvenal Habyrimana in Rwanda (Muchai, 2002 p. 187).

The DR Congo conflict had complex linkages with Rwanda largely because of Hutu militia who fled the country when the current regime of President Kagame ascended into power. Rwanda’s intervention in Congo since 1998 was inspired by a variety of motives that sometimes conflicted. The determination to eliminate security threats and to protect Congolese Tutsi was undermined by the desire for enrichment and the arrogance with which Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) acted in Congo.54
Since President Kagame ascended into power after the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the regime has made great progress towards reconciliation and peace building. Disarmament initiatives have also been accomplished to mop out SALW from circulation amongst civilians as well combatants.

To ensure that demobilised combatants and civilians do not re-arm, disarmament has to be an on-going process with the participation of all stakeholders. FECLAHAA and her constituent members have pertinent roles in discouraging re-armament and to continually sensitize voluntary surrender amongst those who might be possessing SALW.

Ahead of the next general election, there might be possibility of political tensions rising due to the leadership style of the current regime. Also, President Paul Kagame has been in power for two decades and clamour for democratic change could be on the rise. In this respect, it would be prudent for FECLAHAA and other players to closely monitor the country to ensure that mechanisms are in place to foster peaceful co-existence.

### 5.4 Sudan

#### 5.4.1 Root causes corridors and transit roots

The civil war pitting the government of Khartoum and South Sudan has sustained the demand and supply of SALW in the two countries that separated in July 2011 following the latter’s autonomy and independence. Government soldiers contributed to the proliferation as some sold their official firearms to individuals for survival and to secure livelihoods.

Easy availability and access of SALW within the country escalated the conflicts between the Sudan and South Sudan. Influx of SALW into Sudan has mainly been through local sources as well as from outside the Horn of Africa.

Political instability in Libya following the rebellion to ouster that country’s ex-leader Col Muammar Gaddafi had spill over effects on Sudan. Over the past three years, the Arab Spring also contributed to the number of small arms in circulation. Further, the breakdown of order, political instability and flow of SALW and explosives from liberated Libyan military stockpiles into the surrounding countries galvanized existing opposition currents, separatist movements, and transnational militant groups.55

#### 5.4.2 Degree and level of proliferation

It is estimated that there are slightly over two million illegal SALW in circulation within the Sudan and it is not a producing country. The civil war that lasted for decades with South Sudan has largely contributed to the number of small arms in circulation.

Internal political instability and armed rebellion against the Khartoum government are likely to play a multiplier effect to small arms proliferation. Political instability affecting Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region could have ripple effects due to the interconnectedness of conflicts and movement of small arms and light weapons.
Concerned by the levels of proliferation of SALW in the Sudan and the region, the government convened a meeting in May 2012 with the main Agenda being the control of small arms across the borders of Central Africa Republic, Chad, DRC, Libya and Sudan. The high level delegation led by Ministers in charge of security and community safety from the participating countries established the Khartoum Declaration. Also, a follow-up mechanism was established under the auspices of an Executive Committee.

5.4.3 Initiatives to address proliferation

The Sudan is a State Party to the Nairobi Declaration as well as the Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM). It is also a member of the Arab League on Arms Control and Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme under United Nations Programme of Action.

In line with the provisions of DDR Programme, the state plans to disarm 44,000 ex-combatants, re-integrate 22,000 into civilian population and collect over 5,000 small arms and light weapons from Darfur and South Gordofan state. Other initiatives include implementing peace agreements such as Doha Agreement for Peace in Darfur, Darfur Peace Agreement of Abuja and East Sudan Peace Agreement.

Sudan faces the challenge of implementing different regional and international instruments due to its geographical location. Neighbouring countries to the north and west of the Sudan are not parties to the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms. Inevitably, Sudan had to find a common platform with Chad and Libya in respect to addressing small arms proliferation.

The fact that the Sudan found it necessary to participate in different initiatives geared towards addressing small arms proliferation is self-explanatory and defines the magnitude of the problem. This fact also lays emphasis to Sudan’s desire to address proliferation of small arms through multifaceted approaches.

The other dimension that Sudan has been pursuing is bilateral agreements with neighbouring states; Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Sudan towards addressing human trafficking and cross-border movement of SALW and joint patrols. Law enforcement agencies have been playing their role towards enhancing security. However, regions such as Darfur, civilian possession is allowed so long as the citizens follow the laid down regulations and lawful registration. Enforcement of regulations relating to small arms is still inadequate in a country struggling with civilian possession.

Marking of government owned small arms as well those on the hands of the civilians has been underway in collaboration with RECSA. Coordination of government and community leaders contributed to the success of the exercise. In south Darfur state over 10,000 SALW and 1,000 in west Darfur have been registered. Due to insecurity in these states, the government is not in a position to impose forceful disarmament. According to the respondent, the results of this process have been noted particularly confidence building between law enforcement agencies and communities. Subsequently, good relations between the leaders and the communities will create good environment for development.
A new regulation has been enacted in Sudan to replace the 1986-1997 Sudan Law on Arms, Ammunition and Explosives. Due to travel limitations, it was not possible to establish further details on the implementation process of the new law. It is anticipated that the state has the political will to enforce the provisions of the law.

5.4.4 Role of FECCLAHA

At the national level, FECCLAHA could support the Government of the Republic of Sudan in the implementation of the Khartoum Declaration through capacity building, creation of awareness, peace building, training and supporting local mechanisms on arms control programmes.

FECCLAHA also needs to participate in workshops and seminars organized by the state and other stakeholders relating to human security. Involvement of FECCLAHA at such fora would be for the purpose of keeping the Secretariat well informed about various initiatives underway and for the benefit of realizing Best Practices.

5.5 Tanzania

The Tanzania-Uganda border war of the 1980s contributed to the proliferation of SALW in the country. As much as the two governments may have tried to control their armies, it is possible that some SALW infiltrated into illegal circulation.

Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region; Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been an avenue of proliferation for Tanzania particularly through the porous borders that are not effectively controlled. The country has also been home for refugees as a result of civil wars in each of the neighbouring countries.

Control mechanisms to ensure that only genuine refugees cross into the country for asylum have been ineffective largely because of the porous borders. As a result, armed rebels masquerading as genuine refugees could easily conceal illegal small arms and later supply them into the available market.

Pastoralist communities in different parts of the country have also been contributing to the proliferation given that it is easy to acquire SALW in circulation. Many pastoralists who live near the borders of Tanzania-Kenya, Tanzania-Uganda, Tanzania-Rwanda; Tanzania-Burundi; and Tanzania-Democratic Republic of Congo acquire SALW to protect their livelihood.59

Another concern is the fact that cattle rustling have been commercialized in some parts of the country. This problem has been exacerbated by a fair degree of economic liberalisation amongst the East African Community (EAC) countries, particularly Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Price regimes differ across the border where livestock are more lucrative in Kenya and Uganda than in Tanzania. For this reason, well connected individuals have commercialised cattle rustling which they obtain through the power of the barrel. The criminals from Tanzania through networks find more lucrative markets in the neighbouring countries. Commercialization serves as an incentive to cattle rustling and subsequently drives the demand and supply of small arms.
6.1 Overview

The following countries are State Parties to the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States: Burundi, DR Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Admission of Republic of Congo in 2009 and both Central African Republic and Republic of South Sudan in 2011 increased the membership to 15. In 2006, the Nairobi Protocol entered into force following ratification by two thirds of the State Parties.

Each of the state parties of the Nairobi Protocol has established National Focal Points to coordinate the national agenda on SALW. Assessment made by RECSA noted that there is a remarkable difference in terms of the strength each of the NFPs has built since inception. The Burundi Presidential Commission on Civilian Disarmament and Small Arms Control was highly rated for its autonomy, having resources and full time staff. The Commission enjoys budgetary allocation from the government, has support from UNDP as well as other development partners. Burundi provides a model to be emulated on the operations of NFPs, particularly autonomy and budgetary allocation. In 2013, Central Africa Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan were sent to Burundi to learn how they should organize respective NFPs.

The general challenge affecting most of the NFPs is lack of human or material resources. For instance, the Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) and Uganda National Focal Point (UNFP) have an independent office and the staffs are solely dedicated to the office without other duties assigned to them. However, their roles and duties are hampered by lack of financial resources. The NFPs of Rwanda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia have coordinators who operate solely or have limited and temporary staff, who occasionally get deployed in other departments.

Whilst the DRC focal point is very well established and similar to the one of Burundi, it receives limited donor support and appears to struggle with staff remuneration.
South Sudan Bureau for Community Safety and Small Arms Control is very well established but lacks resources. The development partners support the Bureau but the government of South Sudan needs to commit sufficient and sustained funding.

The focal points are required to engage in legal harmonisation in partial fulfilment of the Nairobi Protocol. Rwanda, Burundi and DRC already have new laws on small arms. Even though substantive progress has been made in legal harmonisation, success has been hampered by red tape bureaucracy in government that tends to slow down processes. An example is DRC where the new law on small arms were already completed but presidential ascent was anticipated without a clear time line.

As earlier mentioned, the state parties are at different levels in the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. While countries in the Great Lakes appear to be facing some challenges in the implementation process, those in East Africa and the Horn are at advanced levels in specific aspects such as transforming Small Arms Bills into laws through various legislative procedures. The countries have progressed in upgrading laws to incorporate standards under the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol.

Development of National Action Plans in seven countries among those implementing the Nairobi Protocol have since been completed; Burundi, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Three East African countries; Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have renewed their national strategies on small arms as the previous NAPs had been conducted approximately ten years ago.

During the field study, some respondents noted that the Small Arms Commissions/ NFPs of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan operated exclusively with limited interaction with civil society groups. The partnership between the Commissions and CSO is of absolute importance for mutual benefit. Also, each of the players has respective roles to play in the implementation process. National Coordinators noted that they worked closely with a good number of civil society groups and were willing to reach out to other players in the implementation process.

In stockpile management, marking of SALW has been in progress, credit to RECSA for having provided the necessary guidance and tools. Kenya and Rwanda have already marked SALW used by the military and the police. Burundi has so far managed to mark those SALW in police possession.

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are committed to increasing the percentage of marked SALW close to one 100 per cent within the shortest time possible. Indeed, RECSA region covering the State Parties to the Nairobi Protocol, has been credited for having been the flagship in marking SALW within the continent. Marking is expected to accrue benefits in small arms control, particularly creation of data banks where none existed, improved record keeping, accountability, recovery and traceability.

RECSA has developed software dubbed, Arms Records Data Management. Prior to this notable progress, most of the records were manually kept and in some cases lost due to various hazards and passage of time. Coordinators consulted during the field study were optimistic that the purpose of marking as envisaged in the Nairobi
Protocol would be achieved through the establishment of a Secure Electronic Record Keeping (SERK).

It is anticipated that the SERK will provide strict controls and limited access, given that only authorized officers would be allowed to access the data base. The machines, software and technical support for marking of SALW were provided by RECSA through the financial grant from the government of Japan (Wairagu, 2013).

Countries that already marked SALW under the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol received support through the European Union (EU) and Africa Union (AU) Project coordinated by RECSA. At least Rwanda and Uganda were reported to be ahead in the marking process. Several countries are lagging behind in rolling out marking and record keeping processes due to lack of sufficient resources and required equipment.

Public destruction of recovered and obsolete SALW has been conducted in most of the implementing member states; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. In DRC, the process has been coordinated by Mine Advisory Group which is an international non-governmental organisation committed to reducing the flow of Arms in circulation.

### 6.2 Burundi

The government established the Burundi National Focal Point in 2003 which was integrated into a Technical Commission for the Disarmament of Civilians and the Fight against Small Arms Proliferation (CTDC) in 2006. A National Action Plan (NAP) for Arms Control, Management and Civilian Disarmament was adopted in July 2009 and officially launched in September 2011. Currently, Burundi has a revised National Action Plan 2011 – 2015.

RECSA Secretariat acknowledged the Burundi Commission for outstanding performance among other Focal Points. In particular, RECSA noted that the Commission is autonomous with sufficient staff and budgetary allocation from the central government. Successful initiatives could be attributed to the government budgetary allocation and deployment of permanent staff whose core business is serving the Commission unlike several other countries with lean staff and multiple roles.

The Commission, in collaboration with RECSA, organized an inter-agencies seminar on law enforcement for the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) region on the problem of illicit SALW. It was an opportunity for the Member States to exchange information and enhance collaboration amongst them. At such regional fora, the participation of civil society groups including FECLLAHA would be necessary for synergy, advocacy and partnership in the implementation process of the Nairobi Protocol.

RECSA Secretariat provided three marking machines through the Commission. In fulfilment of the Nairobi Protocol, the Burundi National Police marked 64% of SALW
held by the Commissariat. A total of 18,000 arms for the police were anticipated to be marked by the end of 2013.

Military stocks were yet to be marked and at the time of the study, it was not clear when the exercise should commence. In collaboration with Information Technology managers at the Ministry of Public Security, the Commission commenced the process of establishing an electronic database for the Burundi National Police.

According to the Coordinator, in October 2013; 16,000 grenades, 12,000 small arms and 80,000 ammunitions were recovered. Also, an assortment of small arms was recovered from three provinces including 22 grenades and an 82mm mortal bomb. The recovery was through police seizures, voluntary surrender and recovery by members of the public in the country side. Amnesty programme of 2010 resulted in the surrender of 160,657 ammunition, 540 bombs, 38 landmines, 12,820 grenades and 2,594 firearms. Campaigns to sensitize the communities to surrender SALW were successfully conducted through the coordination of the Commission.

Destruction of recovered SALW is an area that the Commission has been fulfilling as required under the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol. On the list of those destroyed were illicit SALW on the hands of civilian, obsolete and unserviceable SALW. At the destruction ceremony, witnesses from the United Nations were present.

The country amended Article 61 of its Small Arms Law to enable a second national disarmament campaign to be conducted. In collaboration with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) the Commission embarked on rolling out the second national campaign on voluntary disarmament of civilians. The exercise was preceded by sensitization campaigns involving various sectors.

Among those involved were; government administration, defence and security departments, media, local leaders, civil society organisations, religious groups and political parties. Translation of the 2009 law on SALW into Kirundi was accomplished for dissemination and creating awareness among the population.

6.3 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

A National Focal Point was established in 2004 and was later renamed Commission for the Control of SALW in 2008. The Commission developed a National Action Plan (NAP) and established regional offices. Implementation process has not been accomplished due to lack of budgetary allocation, permanent staff as well as political related challenges.

Over the years, the country has been undertaking disarmament of armed civilians and groups through DDR, amnesty programmes encouraging voluntary surrender as well as forceful disarmament. Since 2006, over 100,000 SALW and 1,500 tons of ammunition have been destroyed by burning or cutting methods. DRC has undertaken public awareness on the dangers of illicit possession and misuse of SALW through the media, community mobilization and close work with civil society.
6.4 Eritrea

The National Focal Point (NFP) was established in 2005 at the Police Department. According to the Regional Implementation Strategy published by RECSA for 2009-2014, the NFP has no staff, except the Coordinator who works on a part time basis. The process for developing a National Action Plan was initiated in 2007 and is still in progress.

To support the identification and traceability of SALW, Eritrea received 2 marking machines from RECSA Secretariat. By the time of compiling the Report, the Consultant had not established the current status due to lack of sufficient information.

6.5 Ethiopia

To coordinate the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol (NP), the government established a National Focal Point (ENFP) in 2004. Among other challenges facing the implementation of the NP in Ethiopia is lack of budgetary support from the government and lack of a full time Coordinator. The country is yet to develop a National Action Plan (NAP).

A draft revised law on SALW was produced by the NFP with the support of other stakeholders. It was reported to be under review by the Council of Ministers. However, it was not possible to confirm the current status as the Consultant did not manage to secure an appointment with the ENFP.

Ethiopia NFP has so far undertaken two public destruction of surplus, obsolete, recovered and collected arms in which a total of 27,220 SALW, 458,411 ammunition and 7,639 UXOs were destroyed by end of 2013.

Control of civilian possession has been underway through registration and issuance of certificates to individuals. Through the electronic media, the NFP regularly undertakes public awareness on SALW. Cross border commissions have been set up to coordinate cooperation with neighbouring countries on the implementation of NP although actual cooperation remains weak.

6.6 Kenya

Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was established in 2002 and developed a NAP in 2003 for Arms Control and Management. The initial NAP expired although most of the provisions were yet to be implemented. A new Strategic Plan was developed in 2009 and was officially launched in 2011 on the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

KNFP revised the Policy on Small Arms as the previous one was rather outdated. The process of submitting the Policy to the cabinet as required by law has regained momentum. Exact time lines could not be established considering that the cabinet process follows government procedure outside the control of the KNFP. The country
is also in the process of reviewing SALW national laws and regulations in line with the new constitution. It is hoped that this will offer the opportunity to align the same to international and regional instruments.

Regarding marking the government stocks, at least 60 per cent had already been completed in 2013 including those on the hands of Police, Kenya Wildlife and National Police Reserves. Since inception, KNFP has undertaken the destruction of surplus, obsolete, redundant and collected SALW totalling 23,000.

The KNFP has been taking leadership on Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM) as the chair though this is a rotational position among the State Parties involved and are also implementing the Nairobi Protocol. Through the initiative, cross border meetings are organized to address security related issues with the neighbouring countries particularly Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

At the international level, Kenya co-authored the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and played a key role in pushing the debate to the UN General Assembly. The ATT was adopted in April 2013 and it is currently awaiting ratification and signature by National Security Agency (NSA).

Kenya adopted a wait and see attitude on the ATT process following the contentious 2013 General Elections in relation to the ICC process. President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto were elected to office for a five year term in spite of the fact that they had been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

6.7 Rwanda

Rwanda National Focal Point (RNFP) was established in 2003 in the Ministry of Internal Security to coordinate activities related to monitoring the movement and usage of SALW. A five year National Action Plan (NAP) was approved in 2009 and launched for implementation in 2011. The process slowed down due to limited funding.

The national legislation on SALW has been reviewed in line with Nairobi Protocol. A draft law is currently being examined by the Upper Chamber of Parliament prior to promulgation by authorized institutions.

The Central Firearms Registry was created to register and monitor the stockpile of arms. To support the identification and traceability of SALW, Rwanda received two marking machines from RECSA Secretariat. The marking of police SALW had been accomplished at 100% and military at 60% by end of 2013.

Rwanda NFP in collaboration with other stakeholders co-ordinated the destruction of 46,266 firearms and 51 tons of UXOs consisting of obsolete and unserviceable SALW in circulation. Also, 37 damaged pistols belonging to the International Criminal Court for Rwanda were destroyed in August 2013. In the recent past, Rwanda acquired a cutting machine which works in an environmentally friendly manner to destroy SALW, replacing the public burning method.
The RNFP stands out in the region for its close collaboration with civil society. In early 2013, it collaborated with civil society and hosted a forum to raise awareness on the ratification of the Kinshasa Convention on Small Arms. A regional seminar for Central African countries was held in Kigali with the objective of sharing best practices and experiences in arms marking.

In collaboration with partners, RNFP conducted sensitization of universities and tertiary institution on the proliferation of SALW. Central Firearms Registry Department and civil society organisations conducted public awareness and training. The inclusive approach of sensitizing young adults in higher institutions of learning is an important step towards addressing SALW. This inclusive approach will create a critical mass of students in support of the culture of peace and denounce violence.

### 6.8 South Sudan

The Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control is recognized as an integral part of the government of the Republic of South Sudan. It is regularly involved in and consulted on areas related to its mandate, especially at the state-level. The Bureau continues to address SALW through the promotion of public debate particularly through interactive radio and drama programmes on the state owned radio stations with the objective of reaching out to the communities in rural settings.

A number of public awareness programmes were designed by the Bureau targeting; the public, traditional leaders, disciplined forces, civil society organizations, women and youth in cattle camps. The campaigns focused on increasing knowledge, stimulating dialogue, positively changing perceptions, and attitudes, fostering positive practices on ownership and use of firearms in South Sudan.

Through the support of RECSA, the Bureau marked over 60,000 SALW from the National Police Service, Prisons and Wildlife Services. In attempt to reduce the number of illegal SALW among the civilians, the country engaged in peaceful and voluntary disarmament. Out of the ten states constituting South Sudan, at least five of them were successfully disarmed by end of 2013. Even though a large number of SALW have been recovered, the destruction process has been slow. One of the reasons attributed to lack of regular destruction of SALW recovered from civilian possession, was lack of a policy framework governing the process.

The development and review of Small Arms Control Policy, Legislation and Regulations was underway. Significant progress has been made on the Draft Policy, already debated in Parliament. Once it is enacted, it will be translated into national languages in view of enlightening the citizens through public education. The Bureau has been committed to ensuring effective representation of the country at regional and international fora on policy legal framework.

On stockpile management, the Bureau led a high level delegation of representatives from different security organs to South Africa. The field trip was an opportunity to study on appropriate software to be adopted in the development of the data base on SALW in the country.
The Bureau developed a five year Strategic Plan (2014-2018) based on the findings of a comprehensive evaluation since its inception in 2007 and current situation analysis. It will serve as a blue print/road map for current and future operations and management of SALW for the next five years and beyond. In addition to the SWOT analysis, the Bureau also conducted capacity needs assessment to determine specific areas to be strengthened.

The Strategic Plan, 2014–2018 focus is on nine (9) priority areas. Namely:

i) Strengthening institutional capacity of the Bureau to efficiently and effectively implement its mandate, functions and responsibilities;

ii) Finalization of the policy, enactment of legislation and development of strategy on small arms control;

iii) Raising awareness, sensitization and disseminating information on small arms issues at national, state and community levels;

iv) Complete community consultations in all 24 counties of the remaining 4 states; and continue the implementation of conflict sensitive development projects in all 10 states;

v) Supporting community security through community policing, early warning and early response mechanisms;

vi) Facilitating and coordinating peaceful and voluntary civilian disarmament;
vii) Leading effective engagement with regional governments and international bodies on a collective approach to address proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons;

viii) Physical security and stockpile management;

ix) Develop Monitoring and Evaluation System.

6.9 The Sudan

The Sudan National Focal Point was established in 2004 with full time staff paid by the government. A Draft National Action Plan was completed and now it waits to be presented to the Council of Ministers and subsequently to the parliament for ratification. To keep the activities of the NFP updated and for purposes of planning, the NFP drafted a new Strategic Plan to be adopted by the relevant authorities for implementation.

In early 2013, the Minister of Interior officially launched a pilot project on arms registration. Consultative workshops were conducted in West Darfur State to deliberate with the local government authorities on the pilot project. Arms Registration Committee (ARC) was established and a Technical committee created to oversee activities related to the exercise.

Considering the fact that SALW issues have to be tackled from diverse perspectives, various stakeholders were involved including; National Focal Point, DDR (Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNAMID (United Nations Mission in Darfur) and BICC (Bonn International Centre for Conversion). The technical committees mandate was to monitor progress of the ARCs and address any challenges arising in the course of the project.

To support the identification and traceability of SALW, Sudan received four marking machines from RECSA Secretariat. The Sudan NFP marked 66,000 SALW on the hands of law enforcement agencies and a few in civilians’ possession. However, management and control of SALW has been hampered by instability caused by conflict.

In an effort to enhance the contribution of neighbouring countries towards addressing small arms proliferation, the government of Sudan initiated a regional conference on SALW in 2012. In attendance were representatives from Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya.

6.10 Tanzania

Tanzania’s National Focal Point (TNFP) was established in 2001. Initial NAP was developed by the Arms Management and Disarmament Committee (AMAD) in the same year. The period for the implementation of the NAP lapsed and has since been reviewed for implementation over another five years.

On legal harmonization, a draft bill on SALW legislation that incorporates the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol has been developed with the support of RECSA
and East African Community (EAC). In conjunction with partners and stakeholders, the NFP destroyed 17,634 SALW collected from around the country, including Zanzibar. The destruction events were preceded by public awareness procession consisting of senior government officials from EAC countries, law enforcement agencies, students, the media and the members of public.

The country received two marking equipment from RECSA Secretariat. Marking of state owned SALW and those on the hands of civilians has also been in progress, particularly in the southern zone regions and the capital, Dar es Salaam. At least over 45% of police held SALW have already been marked and 60% of other armed units and in civilian possession. TNFP has been making great progress in the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

### 6.11 Uganda

Uganda established a National Focal Point (UNFP) in 2001 to spearhead the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol (NP). A National Action Plan (NAP) on SALW control and management was developed in 2003 for implementation over a five year period. Since the period lapsed, the NAP was reviewed in 2011 for another five years. The NFP Office has full-time staff and government budgetary support.

Achievements made by the UNFP include marking of state held SALW through the ministry of internal security. Among those marked includes; prisons, private security companies and civilians. Marking of SALW on the hands of the police has been attained up to 98%; military 20%, wildlife security agencies 80% and private security companies at 70%.

UNFP has been keen in improving the capacity of the national police in handling SALW and consequently trained firearms armoury officers in record management. In support of CEWERU (Conflict Early Warning Response Units), the UNFP conducted sensitization of District officers, civil society partners and opinion leaders on conflict early warning.

UNFP conducted Conflict Prevention and Management Response (CPMR) Training for three District Peace Committees (DPCs). In addition, it held consultations with officials in three sub-counties on the establishment of Sub-County Peace Committees. UNFP has been instrumental in convening DPCs and organizing coordination sessions among the peace actors.

Uganda NFP has actively been engaged in public awareness through the media and academic institutions particularly primary schools. Towards the end of 2013, it organized a monitoring visit to Moroto (Uganda) and Lodwar (Kenya) on the project of Empowering Karamoja Women to participate in Peace Building Activities.

In an effort to reduce the number of SALW in illegal circulation, the government granted amnesty decree that targeted rebel factions willing to cease military activities. According to UNFP, over 10,000 ex-combatants renounced rebellion and sought amnesty since 2000. A total of 99,637 SALW and 1,543 tons of UXOs have been destroyed through the coordination of the UNFP since its inception to date (October 2013).
Regional Issues and Emerging Trends

7.1 Practical Disarmament

The traditional approach to disarmament in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa has been through forceful, amnesty and voluntary surrender of SALW. Increase of SALW among non-state actors prompted the United Nations to encompass practical disarmament. The concept of Practical Disarmament was first used in 1995 in the UN’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, reinforcing arms reduction efforts in response to the new phenomena of small arms possession by non-state actors (UN 1995).65

Practical disarmament acknowledges the extensive and complex channels of SALW proliferation as well as the additional reality that these weapons are not only confined to conflict situations, but also afflict communities in peaceful times. In addition to the physical removal of SALW, it deals with other issues relevant to achieving sustainable peace such as socio-economic transformation, improving not only political governance but also human security as well as the promotion of political reconciliation, social tolerance and cohesion necessary for restoration of complete justice and peace during and/or in the aftermath of armed confrontations (RECSA, 2011).66

Ethiopia and South Sudan have been applying practical disarmament. Kenya and Uganda have mainly been engaging in forceful disarmament especially among the pastoralists within Karamoja cluster and northern Kenya. Countries applying forceful disarmament take cognizance that Practical Disarmament is a better approach as it integrates development as well.

Both Uganda and Kenya have changed tact and they are more poised towards Practical Disarmament. Uganda established Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) for this purpose. Kenya has also made deliberate effort towards improving infrastructure and social amenities in pastoralist zones in adoption of the Practical Disarmament approach.

7.2 International Terrorism

International terrorism continues to be a major concern to state security due to the porosity of borders shared with Somalia and the existence of cells affiliated to Al-Shabaab. Terrorists have easy accessibility to SALW and explosives which they use against their targets. Civil society organisations that are inclined to human security have a role to play and support the state to counter international terrorism.
Following the terrorist attacks in Kenya on September 21st the Federal Government of Ethiopia issued high level warning through the media. Considering that Addis Ababa is the home for the African Union (AU), the country had to engage in high security surveillance to ensure the safety of nationals and the international community hosted in Ethiopia.

At a discussion session with a state officer within IGAD, the consultant sought to know why Sudan has not been affected by international terrorism. In response, the respondent explained that the distance between Somalia and the Sudan is a factor restraining attacks. Even though Sudan is largely an Islamic country, the presence of Somalis is minimal. This would be an interesting study to find out what Sudan has done to prevent acts of terrorism that other states would replicate in an effort to improve state security and community safety.

Further, the discussion focused on Ethiopia which shares porous border with Somalia and yet it has not experienced the brunt of terrorism that other neighbouring states like Kenya faces. The military prowess and preparedness of Ethiopia was attributed to the fact that it has not experienced acts of terrorism. According to the respondent if attacked Ethiopia might respond with an equal measure of ferocity.

Al-Shabaab appears to have been applying the mob-psychology tactic where they identify a genuine course and take advantage of the situation. For instance, unemployment in the region has continued to generate a large population of idle youth who have become vulnerable to Al-Shabaab’s tactics.

The youths are lured with the promise of better opportunities and in the process, training and radicalization takes course. It is assumed that among the youth lured by Al-Shabaab, some individuals profess the Christian faith. Inter-faith dialogue and campaign conducted on religious values could contribute in reversing the trend.

A number of groups that appear to have political grievances have been emerging in the region. In some instances, the political groupings get hijacked by leadership whose agenda could be totally different from the expressed grievances.

Kenya’s Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), Darfur Political Groupings and M23 of DRC could have genuine grievances that might have been politicized and radicalized. Such political groups continue to pose great threat to peace and security. Dedicated research studies could be conducted to establish the extent to which political groupings have contributed to instability, affect human security and peaceful co-existence within the region.

### 7.3 Youth, Gender and Small Arms

In conflict environments, the main aggressors are perceived to be those with the access or possession of SALW. Even though males in every society might be the main aggressors, both youth and women are negatively affected by violence and could bear a direct or indirect responsibility.
In some communities, women are the custodians of SALW and they also participate in war songs. The youth get recruited in armed conflict while others are sexually exploited by their captors. Effective post conflict peace building initiatives should address gender based violence perpetrated through the use of SALW. Peace building processes should also be engendered to include women, men and the youth.

7.4 Human immigration and trafficking

Civil conflicts and political instability within the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa continues to force populations to migrate to safer environments. Among immigrants, criminals with intent of trafficking illegal substances such as drugs and small arms could masquerade as innocent victims seeking refuge the neighbouring countries.

There are also individuals who exploit victims of conflict and displacement with the promise of assisting them to travel to destinations of choice abroad. Such victims find themselves trapped or abandoned in capitals in Africa, Middle East or Europe.

Amongst innocent immigrants there could be criminals responsible for trafficking SALW. For law enforcement agencies to apprehend criminals likely to be masquerading as innocent victims, they would require reliable information that could assist such operations. FECCLAHA’s network through the church constituent members may suffice as avenue of information sharing and exchange.

7.5 Trans-border and organized crime

Crimes committed across national borders are commonly referred to as trans-border crimes. Examples of trans-border crimes includes, vehicle theft, money laundering, trafficking in narcotics, drugs and psychotropic substances, human trafficking, cyber-crime and livestock, commonly referred to as cattle rustling. Such crime threatens human security in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa mainly because of easy accessibility and availability of small arms and light weapons that are preferred by criminals.

SALW are easy to conceal, can be dismantled and re-assembled with little effort. These tools of violence are used for to escort stolen goods such as vehicles or livestock from one country to another. Through addressing the problem of small arms proliferation, by extension, trans-border crimes will also be tackled.

The Lord’s Resistance Army is an appropriate example of an organized group with a transnational character that has been destabilising populations in northern Uganda along the border with South Sudan. Due to the military operation mounted by Uganda’s People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), LRA moved down to the border regions of Central African Republic (CAR) and DR Congo. LRA operations have a transnational character asserted through the use of force particularly SALW against innocent civilians.

Organized criminal groups tend to operate within the national as well as across borders mainly because they have easy access to SALW. The Great Lakes and the
Horn of Africa continue to face security challenges caused by organized criminal groups with differing motives of controlling natural resources or for political and economic gains.

In most cases, organized criminal groups are outlaws who engage in gender violence and sexual exploitation of their victims. Approaches geared towards improving human security need to also focus on ways and means of addressing organized criminal groups who negatively impact on peace and security.

7.6 Armed militia and rebel groups

Rebel groups and armed militia continue to be a major threat to human security particularly because they have access to SALW. A number of processes underway to consolidate peace gains in the region could easily be undermined by militia and rebel groups.

A case in point is disgruntled politicians in Uganda who withdrew from mainstream politics. They recruited rebels in eastern DRC to stage orchestrated attacks on the government forces with the grievance that President Yoweri Museveni has been in power over a long period of time. The rebels have not only been destabilising Uganda but eastern DRC as well.

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that was founded in northern Uganda and moved along the border with South Sudan first then to DRC and CAR continues to be a security threat. Political instability in Somalia has continued being a cause of concern in the region with direct impact on Kenya and Ethiopia. The weak governance structures in Somalia further complicates an already fragile human security situation in the Horn of Africa.

South West Somalia Liberation Front, Uganda based Allied Democratic Front (ADF), armed groups in South Sudan and SPLM faction led by Riek Macher, Oganden National Liberation Front (located along the Somalia region of Ethiopia) are all examples of armed militia groups bent on destabilising respective countries.

The OLF and ONLF within the Gabela Region of Southern Ethiopia have been fighting the government to gain control of the oil fields. The government has been negotiating with the leaders of some of the rebel groups based within her territory as a way of neutralizing the forces.

Bilateral problems between states have at times complicated the problem of unresolved insurgent groups. For instance, Eritrea has continued to support groups opposed to Ethiopia leading to allegations of supporting insurgent groups opposed to either government. Such groups impact negatively to state and community security and contribute to SALW proliferation supplied directly or through the porous borders.

However, threats of sanctions by the United States have contributed to a reduction of Eritrea involvement with rebel groups opposed to the government of Ethiopia. To
some extent, Eritrea’s threat on Ethiopia has been on the decline but weak controls are likely to continue favouring proliferation of SALW.

In spite of looming sanctions against Eritrea, there is still possibility that the flow of SALW could still continue from Middle East through Asmara into Somalia for use by the Al-Shabaab. The statelessness in Somalia has contributed to making her ports easy entry points of SALW.

According to one of the respondents, there is high possibility that the Kampala terrorist’s attacks of July 2010 were staged by ADF who had been trained by the Al-Shabaab. This factor defines a linkage between armed groups across different countries in the region. The Al-Shabaab also has been training members of their group from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia.

7.7 Natural resources

A number of processes are currently ongoing that have major impact on SALW issues in the region. For instance, drought risks reduction, infrastructure development and extractive industries especially in pastoralist regions are likely to cause conflict and drive demand and supply of SALW.

While it is understandable that FECCLAHA cannot conduct advocacy on all emerging issues, the major role for the organisation would be to promote information sharing through public fora on these pertinent issues.

“The government of Ethiopia restricts “Governments should not celebrate military victory but rather play weak when they are actually strong.”

Respondent: in relation to M23 defeat by the government of DR Congo.
This section highlights some of the key findings and provides some recommendations based on the study objectives. Considering the fact that details are presented in the text directly or indirectly, attempt is made to have this section precise and concise as much as possible. Similar recommendations are grouped together under sub-headings in an attempt to contextualize issues and for clarity.

8.1 Nyumba Kumi Initiative

Following several fatal terror attacks on the people of Kenya, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government laid emphasis to the fact that the citizens and residents needed to know their neighbours and initiated the Nyumba Kumi (ten-houses).

FECCRAHA’s constituent member in Kenya, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCK) has national networks that should contribute towards the success of this important initiative. The need for FECCRAHA to address human security from a broad perspective cannot be over emphasized. The traditional approach has been confined to peace building perspectives but diversification would be a priority to contributing to human security.

The idea of community safety needs to be pursued not only in Kenya but also in the sub-regions. Once a critical mass within the church establishment embraces the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, it should be fairly easy for the state to roll out to other parts of the country. FECCRAHA could venture into identifying countries where Nyumba Kumi Initiative has worked well. For instance, the versions adopted by Tanzania and Uganda under local councils could have some lessons to be learned and replicated.

The church leadership might not be privy to underlying causes as they tend to focus more on the manifestations of insecurity and conflict as opposed to addressing the root causes. Hence the need for the church to assert itself more in the field of human security as opposed to assuming that the responsibility largely lies on the state and other key actors and not the church.

Forging a close working relation with the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) would provide FECCRAHA with a platform to influence policy on issues relating to
SALW. During the destruction of SALW, one of the key roles that FECCLAHA among other civil society groups could play is to confirm details of the listed SALW for destruction and maintain a record. This would be mainly for advocacy purposes and to ascertain that the recovered small arms are destroyed accordingly and not recirculated.

8.2 Strategic Partnerships with Saferworld and UNDP

A number of organisations have been involved in the campaign against the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Among outstanding organisations is Saferworld which has played a pertinent role in supporting the National Focal Points charged with the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. Considering that that Saferworld has offices in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan, FECCLAHA might consider partnering with Saferworld on SALW interventions.

In partnership with UNDP, Saferworld has been sensitizing communities on imminent disarmament. At the event of forceful or voluntary disarmament, sensitizing the communities ahead of the exercise largely contributes to the success of the initiative. Awareness also contributes to appreciation of disarmament set objectives, that is; enhancing security and peace while promoting development. A sensitised community would be more informed to cooperate with the authorities due to prior knowledge and information. Partnership with these two organisations on specific community based projects would be value adding to FECCLAHA.

‘Gun free zone’ campaign championed by Saferworld needs replication amongst communities in the region. FECCLAHA could partner with Saferworld and UNDP in the gun-free campaign with specific target areas such as watering-points and market places which are susceptible to violent conflicts amongst pastoralist communities.

Saferworld has also been playing the role of advising international organisations on the dynamics relating to human security in South Sudan. In a Case Study conducted by Saferworld on the Role of China in South Sudan, one of the key findings were that there was need to make Chinese engagement conflict sensitive as this component was lacking. The initiative contributed to better understanding between the two governments, civil society and the communities. Conflict prevention and development projects were established to the benefit of the people of South Sudan.

The partnership between the governments of South Sudan, China and civil society is an important forum that FECCLAHA may consider participation to widen the scope of engagement. Also, FECCLAHA could fundraise from the Chinese, against the backdrop that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in China are funded by the government. Lessons learned from state funding of CSOs, could be of benefit in terms of seeking budgetary allocation from national governments in the region.
In practice, most international organisations tend to operationalize their projects with local partners. FECCLAHA could place the Secretariat strategically in terms of bridging the gap between international partners such as the government of the Peoples’ Republic of China, civil society groups and the communities through the national wide constituency that FECCLAHA enjoys in the region.

A coordination mechanism is required to ensure that the international partners share information and update each other on various activities undertaken. This is for the purpose of eliminating duplication, increasing delivery of services and assistance to those in most dire need.

Even though FECCLAHA might not have the capacity to play the role of a coordinator, at least the organisation could take leadership on advocacy issues based on small arms and make contribution to human security.

FECCLAHA’s Strategic Plan 2014-2018 spells out the commitment to contribute towards addressing human security and in particular SALW. This is a powerful resolve as opposed to engaging on an ad hoc basis. In the implementation process of the Strategic Plan, deliberate effort is required for FECCLAHA to get involved in strategic partnerships formerly and through signing and actualizing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with strategic partners such as Saferworld and UNDP.

8.3 Strategic Partnerships with CEWARN

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is a collaboration effort of the seven IGAD Member States; Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. CEWARN is one of the IGAD’s programmes targeted at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region.

Among the principle needs that led to the establishment of CEWARN, was the proliferation of and availability of SALW in the region. Also, endemic violent cross border pastoralist conflicts, continued threat of inter-state wars arising from cross border inter-communal and inter-clan conflicts motivated IGAD member states establish CEWARN.

CEWARN mandate is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. Further, to undertake analysis of the information and develop case scenarios and formulate options for response.

From various angles, CEWARN appears to be a natural choice for FECCLAHA to partner with. In terms of the organisational structure, at the regional level, FECCLAHA could make input to the Peace Councils. At the national level, FECCLAHA appears to have a role cut out in the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU).
FECCCLAHA constituents’ main input would be membership in the Sub-Committee that evaluates the reports generated by CEWERU prior to submission to CEWARN. Evaluation of the reports is logical and of absolute importance to ensure that issues relating to SALW and human security are well captured, presented or formulated.

The platform also presents available opportunity for FECCCLAHA to participate at the national level by sponsoring field monitors. CEWERU constituency is made up of government and civil society organisations, district peace committees, and national research institutes. FECCCLAHA should sponsor field monitors for purposes of community representation and to ascertain issues pertaining to human security are fully factored and appropriately articulated.

Whilst the mandate of CEWARN is well articulated, the early warning component largely focuses on conflict and does not seem to include a similar approach to SALW and in effect human security. There is an apparent gap that requires input from different stakeholders including FECCCLAHA in terms of conducting early warning on SALW proliferation. In partnership with CEWARN and Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), FECCCLAHA representing civil society groups should establish mechanism for SALW early warning. To some extent, this appears to be a grey area that requires immediate exploration.

FECCCLAHA has the advantage of contributing to formulation of SALW indicators for identifying the movement of SALW. Some of the indicators include a trend where more individuals are physically spotted carrying SALW for example amongst pastoralist communities. A rise in violent crimes could also serve as an indicator that there is increasing demand and supply. Hence, the possibility to map-out and predict movement of SALW especially with the support of community leaders at the grassroots.

Information gathering and dissemination is another important role that FECCCLAHA could play with great ease and efficiency. This proposition is based on the fact that the Secretariat’s constituency stretches to the grassroots where individuals could have access to important information relating to looming conflicts and armament.

Sharing information with CEWERU field monitors would be a great contribution for warning the relevant state security agencies to take appropriate action and initiate early response mechanisms. In terms of research and information gathering, FECCCLAHA constituency should sponsor grassroots based candidates as field monitors if they merit and qualify.

CEWARN intends to re-modify approaches relating to data collection, collating, analysis and dissemination. As a practice, CEWERU in collaboration with Research Institutes has been largely responsible for information collection process. Re-engineering of the process to include a consortium of organisations based on their respective strengths is an interesting development that FECCCLAHA stands to gain from. Indeed, this is an opportunity that the Secretariat should pursue with CEWARN through initiating and operationalizing MoU as a starting point, thus cementing leverage provided by grassroots linkages.
CEWARN will be undertaking review of its strategy; FECCLAHA could be invited to make input. Early warning mechanism should be diversified to include, terrorism as well as armament. The process should cover mapping out areas that are easy targets of terrorism among all IGAD countries. With grassroots connections, FECCLAHA could contribute towards information gathering and dissemination.

Conflict early warning relies on networking of all stakeholders including state agencies, affected communities and civil society groups. FECCLAHA’s presence at the grassroots is an important leverage to be taken advantage of.

### 8.4 Strategic partnership with Research Institutes

Effective engagement on human security would involve primary research in respect to identifying the core issues requiring intervention. Considering FECCLAHA’s mandate, capacity and limitations, it is important to collaborate with think tanks and research institutes. Through such partnership, FECCLAHA would develop an advocacy strategy based on research findings.

In the best interest of the communities affected by human security, FECCLAHA should add value by conducting advocacy work and lobby governments to address issues emerging out of primary research. Research findings are always available in different publications released by the institutions. To tap into the regular flow of research findings, it is recommended that FECLLAHA considers initiating partnership with such organisations through Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Advocacy on research findings is based on FECCLAHA’s inherent strength and a solid constituency network across the region. If well harnessed, the constituency would be an incredible advocacy and campaigning force. Important to reiterate that the organisation needs to institute a system or a process of capturing, developing, sharing, and effective usage of key findings from SALW research to inform her advocacy efforts.

For instance, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducts primary and applied research on a regular basis. As a think tank, ISS does not engage in advocacy work as the institute’s aim is to enhance human security by providing independent and authoritative research, expert policy analysis and advice, training and technical assistance.

### 8.5 Peace Education and Culture of Peace

In consideration of the number of conflicts that have been ongoing in the region, it is apparent that in some zones, a culture of violence seems to have developed over time. Through advocacy work, it is possible to reverse the trend and cultivate a culture of peace.
Essentially, Peace Education requires to be integrated in school curricular in an effort to reverse the culture of violence. FECLLAHA should play advocacy role and appeal to national governments to integrate Peace Education in the school curricular. Based on her leverage and connections at the grassroots, this is a role that FECLLAHA should play with ease.

FECLLAHA and her partners could contribute in harmonizing state and citizens’ relations. Specifically, there is need to remind communities of their role and responsibility in working with state agencies towards improving human security and community safety. Amongst most communities in the region, only lose linkages exist between the state and citizens at the grassroots level. Hence the need to increase bottom-up interaction, information sharing while bridging the gap between the state and respective communities.

Poverty has been creating grounds for the acquisition of SALW. In an effort to revert the trend, most governments in the region have come up with Youth Programmes. As the youth constitute a large portion of the population, FECLLAHA could work with the constituent members to monitor the implementation of such programmes. Idle youth have been targeted by various groups for training and committing atrocities in the region. Hence, ensuring maximization of the Youth Programmes would be a contribution to human security directly and indirectly.

Trauma healing is an important component of post conflict peace and confidence building particularly for countries like South Sudan and Burundi that experienced long spells of civil war. FECLLAHA constituents could play a significant role in establishing listening centres where war victims assemble to share experiences, stories of war, etc., under the guidance of professional counsellors.

This is an important process given that the victims require support in re-establishing relationships in respective communities. The listening centres would also provide a platform for forgiveness and reconciliation. Group therapy under the facilitation of a trained counsellor is a crucial approach that should tap into cultural values and traditional heritage. FECLLAHA’s role would be to empower the church leaders on training and capacity building. Also, in trauma healing considering her strength in influencing positive behaviour change through spirituality.

### 8.6 Disarmament

Interventions made by state agencies, intergovernmental bodies, international and civil society organisations, have contributed to the reduction of the number of SALW in circulation particularly amongst the pastoralists. For instance, at the Karamoja cluster, there has been a decline on cattle raids that could be attributed to practical disarmament, state intervention and desire for peace and security amongst affected communities.

Successful disarmament initiatives need to be shared in the region as a motivation for the communities to surrender SALW in their possession whenever approached by the state. Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) successfully completed a study on Best Practices for Practical Disarmament.
In terms of accessibility to the communities in the region, FECCLAHChA has the right platform to share lessons learned. Leveraging on her position, FECCLAHChA should encourage organisations to replicate lessons learned for the benefit of respective communities.

8.7 Reformation of SPLA

Reformation of SPLA is an important aspect in enhancing human security in South Sudan. Factionalism within the armed forces has been based on ethnicity, which is a key factor in contributing to conflict, insecurity and political instability. In an effort to unify the factions, efforts have been made to establish an SPLA Headquarter Division in each of the states though they tend to be tribal based.

Every two divisions have been placed under one command, in view of uniting the factions and increasing ethnic tolerance. A Lieutenant General is in charge of each Division and is answerable to the Ministry of Defence.

As South Sudan is still in the process of establishing institutions, a good number of the armed forces do not live in the barracks. There is concern that the facility is not adequate to accommodate all the soldiers. This has created grounds for corruption as there are real and imaginary soldiers on the pay roll.

In South Sudan, the DDR process was initiated by the United Nations Mission in following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The UNMISS mandate is to consolidate peace and security and help to establish conditions for development.

8.8 Mediation

Impartiality is one of the key attributes of a good mediator. Based on this aspect, FECCLAHChA has an important role to play as a faith based organisation. In due consideration of the South Sudan conflict, FECCLAHChA needs to lend a hand to the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and support the mediation process between the state, rebel factions and the conflicting communities.

In an effort to reduce the demand and supply of SALW in conflict situations, it is important to build the capacity of the clergy so that they use the pulpit effectively to preach peace and reconciliation. At the same time, the clergy requires capacity in conflict early warning, prevention and mediation as they engage with respective communities spiritually.

8.9 Media outreach

The media plays a key and pertinent role in information dissemination. Establishing close working partnerships with the national and regional media constitutes incredible strength for FECCLAHChA towards influencing government efforts on SALW and human
security. Deliberate effort is required towards engaging individuals in print and electronic media who would be willing to support FECCLAHA and her constituent members.

In terms of broad outreach, FECCLAHA should consider printing pamphlets with pictures and messages. The content should be written and translated in simple language for the purpose of creating awareness on the dangers of SALW.

Ethiopia has a Peace Manual written in Amharic that offers guidelines on common issues. Lessons learned should be replicated in developing similar guidelines on the role of the media, individuals and the community in enhancing human security.

**8.10 Capacity Building and Training**

The constituent membership of FECCLAHA is not at the same level of development in terms of technology, resources and priorities. Based on this, it should be of great benefit to assist constituent members build and harness their capabilities. Where capacity building initiatives already exist, the training programmes needs to be coordinated and tailor made to meet the requirements of each of FECCLAHA constituent members.

Regional advocacy efforts would only be sustained if they are backed by broader and effective national leadership. Given that most of the SALW instruments regardless of whether they are global or regional, the impact is mainly experienced at the local and national levels. Hence the importance of empowering the clergy within FECCLAHA’s constituency so that they might contribute in creating a positive impact in their respective communities.

The pulpit is an important platform for information dissemination, advocacy and awareness creation. Enhancing the capacity of the clergy is therefore necessary to enable them broaden the scope of preaching to include messages of peace and the dangers of SALW proliferation. Messages should include raising levels of awareness amongst the communities of their rights and duties towards human security. While it is the right of the individual to demand security from the state, there is also the duty to share information with the security enforcement agencies for appropriate action against those who cause a breach of the peace, engage in crime and possess SALW.

A number of practitioners interviewed noted that FECCLAHA’s constituency must of necessity engage in conflict prevention and building the local capacity of the communities. This is for the purpose of enabling them to engage in sustained culture of peace and dialogue for a gun-free society. In addition, focus should be directed towards change of perception in negative ethnicity, possession of SALW and the role of individuals in relation to improving human security.

**8.11 Implementation of Regional Instruments**

As a faith based organisation, FECCLAHA’s natural mandate on peace and reconciliation should be pursued at the national level by making the government of the day more accountable. Left on their own, governments have a lot of responsibilities
and might not necessarily prioritize implementation of instruments governing issues of SALW.

On behalf of the communities, FECCLAHA should monitor the implementation of the instruments, demand accountability and update on the progress made in abiding with national, regional and international legal requirements.

Intervention at the policy formulation level is an important contribution that FECCLAHA should make to ensure that there is strict control of civilian possession of SALW. The avenue to achieve this could be through increased partnership between the state and FECCLAHA.

In particular, participation at public awareness programmes; set by national governments as a constitutional requirement at the establishment of new laws. In countries where this requirement is not in force, FECCLAHA’s contribution should be to urge governments to put in place mechanisms for involving and creating awareness amongst communities.

Policies relating to human security and SALW in particular are often in complex language, structure and condensed in content and meaning. One of the roles that FECCLAHA could play effectively is to unpack policies to a level easily understood by their constituencies in the process of public education, advocacy, and community awareness.

In the implementation process of the Nairobi Protocol among other instruments, states in the region have come up with legislation or set of rules outlining acquisition, possession, transfer and handling of SALW. A gap exists in terms of interpreting such laws to the communities.

FECCLAHA could play an important role through the constituent members, by explaining the implications of new legislation governing SALW. Essentially, the legal and judicial implication of the laws should be understood at the individual level. Respective communities need to be assisted in appreciating accrued benefits.

At the national, regional and international levels, the participation and presence of FECCLAHA at SALW fora is fundamental, where states exchange views and report at plenary on progress made in the implementation process. A senior officer at Regional Centre on Small Arms recommended that FECCLAHA’s presence needs to be felt through increased participation at the national and regional levels. 

8.12 Best Practices

To effectively engage on issues of human security, it is important that FECCLHA goes beyond spiritual matters as demonstrated by the inter faith council of Ethiopia. The council conducts dialogue forums where citizens share experiences and express views on issues affecting them. FECCLAHA should play a lead role in organizing discussion platform regarding human security. Such a forum is an important tool for empowering the communities with information and knowledge.
In Ethiopia, one of the initiatives undertaken to address pastoralist and ethnic based conflicts is the establishment of Common Markets where communities gather to exchange goods and livestock. These common markets have created opportunities for pastoralists and farmers to exchange goods as they get to appreciate each other’s way of life.

On the flip side, the Common Markets have also presented a challenge in that tax collection has had to be levied from the traders. Unlike in an informal setting where the communities exchange goods, the Common Markets have presented a platform for different traders to assemble for tax-collection. To a large extent, Common Markets have served to reduce conflicts between pastoralists and farmers as well as ethnic hostilities.

The other advantage of the Common Markets is the fact that they constitute an avenue of early warning in the sense that in case of looming hostilities, it is possible to track the trend and prevent conflicts before they occur.74

Ethiopia has a peace manual written in Amharic for purposes of inculcating religious values. Each religious leader rolls it out depending on respective faith and the Holy Books; the Bible and the Quran. To replicate this initiative, FECLAH should support her broad based constituency by preparing simple pictorial messages underpinning the consequences of the possession of SALW. For intent and purposes, this practice should be replicated in the Horn and the Great Lakes region. Values contained in the holy books should not be relegated to second position but prioritized in principle and application.

To address proliferation amongst civilians and to curb likely misuse, FECLAH should leverage their position and discourage individuals from acquiring firearms either legally or through illegal means.

FECLAH has convening mandate and a wide spectrum of interaction through her broad membership of churches. Advantage should be taken every Sunday to preach messages of peace and condemn possession of SALW.

In spite of the dangers involved in SALW possession, a few elitist in the society and pastoralist communities still seek registration of SALW from the state for legal possession. To increase the level of community safety, there should be state-church collaboration in vetting those who apply for firearms. In this respect, FECLAH needs to coordinate with national councils to ensure that the state involves church leaders during the vetting process of the applicants. Involvement would also increase chances for FECLAH to monitor proliferation of SALW at a different level.

To address proliferation amongst civilians and to curb likely misuse, FECLAH and constituent members should leverage their position and use every possible avenue to discourage individuals from acquiring firearms through legal and illegal means.

Participation in establishing alternative means of livelihood for pastoralist would reduce the demand of SALW and eventually address some of the reasons propelling communities to acquire firearms.
Youthful population is one of the common characteristics within the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. For this reason, opportunity lies in adapting to the changing times and work closely with youth groups on human security related issues as opposed to the traditional approach of partnering only with well-established organisations.

Idle youth are susceptible to recruitment in rebel groups, criminal gangs and as players in organized crime. FECCLAHA and her constituent members should get involved in undertaking advocacy work on the underlying factors that contribute to unemployment among the youth. These factors include corruption, nepotism, and importation of manufactured goods, lack of visionary leadership and politicization of the economy. While using the power of the pulpit, religious leaders must continue condemning vices that affect the youth and future generations. Also, the church leaders need to hold governments responsible and accountable to the citizenry of their respective countries.

Radicalization of the youth using religion as a vehicle has become one of the challenges facing most countries in the region as security threat increases. Inter-faith dialogue and campaign on a religious platform should be an important contribution toward reversing the trend.

8.13 Leveraging on FECCLAHA’s Advantageous Position

In the region, a good number of civil society groups are funded by foreign donors. This factor has occasionally created suspicion over the interests served by some organisations. Even though faith based organisations also receive donor funding, they command a fair share of legitimacy. In environments where governments are rather strict on civil society operations, there is no government that out rightly says they are against peace. This is the reason why FECCLAHA should leverage on credibility and get more involved in addressing SALW proliferation to improve human security.

As a regional faith based organisation, FECCLAHA has convening mandate and regional outlook. With convening mandate, FECCLAHA has the potential to bring cross border players together at high, medium and grassroots levels. The opportunity serves not only for spiritual related matters but also on issues affecting human security.

Preach the gospel of peace and put emphasis to the doctrine that conflicts could be transformed through non-violent means. Advantage has to be taken of the fact that faith based organisations like FECCLAHA have leverage in cultivating the culture of peace and tolerance between different religions, groups, clans, etc. Inter-religious dialogue forum to enlist the support of the state in translating messages of peace and denouncing the use of SALW and violence would be an appropriate opportunity for FECCLAHA and her constituent members to pursue.
In consideration of the fact that radicalization among the youth is in most cases religious based, ECCLAHA and her constituents needs to design mechanisms appealing to the youth to denounce hostility, embrace harmony and peaceful co-existence. Some of the simple mechanisms that FECCLAHA could put in place as a contribution towards improving human security are to identify recurrence grievances that lead to violence and radicalization of vulnerable youth. For example, grievances relating to land and political representation have the tendency to turn violent if not addressed over time.
9 Possible Areas of FECCLAHA Engagement

9.1 Immediate: Strategic Partnerships

FECCLAHA leadership needs to organize a meeting with IGAD-CEWARN with the objective of appreciating each other’s roles and in the process, identify areas of mutual benefit. The partnership between FECCLAHA and CEWARN should progressively be cemented through a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU).

Identify the best practices in CEWARN that the Secretariat could replicate towards developing conflict early warning in SALW.

Establish partnership with AU Commission in view of calving out a strategic position in the implementation of the ‘African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.’ The formal partnership could offer fundraising opportunities for rolling out FECCLAH’s Strategic Plan.

Formalize partnership with Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) in support of the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and related instruments. Establish a mechanism of monitoring the implementation process of the Nairobi Protocol at the national and regional levels.

Among other challenges, most of the National Focal Points were found to be facing financial limitations that negatively impact on the implementation process. In partnership with other stakeholders, FECCLAHA could jointly fundraise to support the implementation of National Strategies on Small Arms.

Within the umbrella of Eastern Africa Network on Small Arms (EANSA), FECCLAHA needs to utilize her competitive advantage as a faith based organisation towards making a difference in human security. This should be achieved through developing messages of peace and harmony to counter religious radicalization. With the assistance of the national constituencies, identify recurrence grievances and seek the intervention of government technical departments.

Create a panel of Christian-church leaders to dialogue on human security. Such a panel would be instrumental in establishing the desired change in human security.

Increase linkage with national parliaments so as to effectively monitor implementation of various programme targeting specific communities and the youth. Playing the role of a watchdog would contribute towards monitoring exploitation of vulnerable communities by unscrupulous leaders and politicians.
As donor funding continues to decline due to global recession and change of priorities, FECCLAHA and her constituent members should establish a mechanism to ensure that direct benefits reach respective communities. The idea is to make organisations more accountable to the specific communities that they serve.

### 9.2 Medium Term

In partnership with respective ministries in charge of education, FECCLAHA could make input to content, materials and media as applicable in peace campaign at the school level. In countries where this has already been addressed, the implementation process would still require FECCLAHA’s input.

It is important for the state to occasionally meet civil society groups participating in human security initiatives. Such platform is lacking in most countries within FECCLAHA constituency. This gap should be filled by the establishment of a state-civil society dialogue platform for exchange of information and for lessons learned at the local, national and regional levels. The platform would enhance state-civil society partnership, understanding and collaboration.

FECCLAHA has the opportunity to take leadership in unpacking RECSA’s Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for proficient implementation.

### 9.3 Long Term

In support of disarmament initiatives, FECCLAHA’s constituency could make tangible contribution by mobilizing individuals and communities ahead of the exercise. In some instances, governments apply force where communities are perceived to be uncooperative. Participation by FECCLAHA’s constituency through public education and awareness would contribute in softening the stance of the communities targeted for disarmament. Essentially, this would minimize negative aggression from law enforcement agencies and increase cooperation.

In instances where forceful disarmament might aggrieve the communities, the role of FECCLAHA is cut out in terms of conducting reconciliation with respective authorities. This would go hand in hand with creating awareness ahead of disarmament initiatives as an important component to demonstrate that the government means well and the process is calculated in the best interest of the communities.

During disarmament exercises, FECCLAHA and her constituents could play a mundane role by providing transport to guarantee the safety of the surrendered and recovered SALW. The purpose of this is to ensure that surrendered and recovered SALW do not get back into circulation. At the disposal point of the recovered SALW, FECCLAHA’s presence as observer during destruction would go a long way towards confidence building and to the success of future disarmament initiatives.

The other role that FECCLAHA could play is to liaise with research institutions and establish key reasons for armament and engage in advocacy work accordingly. As earlier stated, advocacy is required on research findings as a means to benefiting communities who constitute sources of primary data.
Communities may require assistance in establishing projects geared towards addressing factors that increase the demand and supply of SALW. As an incentive, the communities need to be involved in establishing such projects as opposed to situations where conditions are set by the donors on bilateral levels.

The DDR process is a multi-agency engagement with each of the roles based on the strengths of respective stakeholders. In respect to FECCLAHA constituents’ role, ex-combatants require support in overcoming gun-culture and embracing the culture of peace as they get re-integrated.

Enhance dialogue between security agencies and communities as a means to improving information dissemination, security and safety. In Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warabi, Saferworld encouraged the communities to engage in dialogue with the police. Through dialogue, community policing improved as the members trusted and cooperated better with the police. 75

9.4 Fundraising

Target African Union for endorsement in fundraising and support the implementation of the Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Seeking endorsement is an important strategy as some donors only fund inter-governmental bodies and international organisations.

Joint fundraising with other stakeholders in support of implementing the National Strategies on Small Arms needs to be explored.

In addition to targeting traditional donors, there is need to also approach corporate on social responsibility, lobby for increased government budgetary allocation and enlist support from philanthropists.

International Research Development Centre (IDRC), Governance, Security and Justice Programme should be explored for grants in research. The Prospectus explaining the procedure is available on the organisation’s website: www.idrc.ca

Fundraising efforts could also target the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom: www.gov.uk

Several Embassies based at capitals such as Nairobi could also be sources of funding; European Union, The Royal Dutch Embassy and the Swedish Embassy, among others.

A number of respondents noted that lack of resources has been slowing down the implementation process of NAPs. This could be attributed to donor fatigue and shift of strategic interests. FECCLAHA along other actors should develop new strategies for fundraising. One of the approaches should be to re-package the proposals in such a way that they focus on human security and development while incorporating SALW issues as sub-themes.

FECCLAHA needs to take lead in facilitating joint advocacy and forums on peace and on campaign against SALW especially during the Global Week of Action against Gun Violence as envisaged Strategic Plan 2014-1018.
End Notes

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Interview with a respondent

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SWOT analysis refers to Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

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69 Phone interview with a respondent

70 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) website: [www.issafrica.org](http://www.issafrica.org)

71 David NIYONZIMA, Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS); interviewed on 19th November 2013 in Bujumbura

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75 Ranga Gworo, Saferworld; interviewed in Juba on 29th of November 2013.
Annex One: List of Documents


Best Practices Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States; RECSA, 2011.

Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons; RECSA.

Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States: RECSA-Nairobi; RECSA.


United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.
# Annex Two: List of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silvester Arinaitwe</td>
<td>Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), Executive Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Mugisha</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Action Network on Small Arms (EANSA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christine</td>
<td>Eastern African Sub regional Support Initiative for Advancement of Women Executive Director (EASSI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Uganda National Focal Point (UNFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Muhereza</td>
<td>Makerere University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Karamoja Integrated Disarmament &amp; Development Program (KIDDIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Fisher Tumwesigye</td>
<td>East African Regional Institute of Legal Affairs &amp; Policy Studies, Ag Executive Director</td>
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<td>Richard Nabudere</td>
<td>Saferworld Associate Consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rose Otieno</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Executive Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrick Bwire</td>
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<td>Baritonda</td>
<td>National Commission for SALW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laurent Wakana</td>
<td>National Commission for SALW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerard Nkuruntiba</td>
<td>PNVD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexandre</td>
<td>NECB, Head of Peace &amp; Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sinzikayo Jean-Claude</td>
<td>MI-PRD National Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deogratias Ninyibuka</td>
<td>Burundi Action Network on Small Arms (BUANSA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aimable Nzoyisenga</td>
<td>CIDEP, Centre of Support Local Development &amp; Assistance of Vulnerable Persons, Legal Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathan Byamukama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Titus Ningejeje</td>
<td>BECAP – Director</td>
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<td>Obianuju Nwobi</td>
<td>UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Security Sector Reform Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desire Ndagijimana</td>
<td>DDR – Peace House</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Niyonzima</td>
<td>Trauma Healing and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Duke Geoffrey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ranga Gworo</td>
<td>Saferworld, Project Coordinator Juba</td>
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<td>Amarendra Bhuyan</td>
<td>UNMISS – DDR, Juba</td>
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<td>David Udofia</td>
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<td>Sam Muhumure</td>
<td>UNDP – Community Security &amp; Arms Control Project (CSAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Akek Cien</td>
<td>South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), Ag General Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Pande</td>
<td>Justice Africa, Senior Program Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Long John Rombek</td>
<td>Caritas South Sudan, Justice &amp; Peace Coordinator</td>
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<td>Shem Ochuodho</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Jimmy Long</td>
<td>Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference</td>
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<td>Vincent Lelei</td>
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<td>Kisoso Huho</td>
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<td>Geoffrey S. Chichi</td>
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<td>John Patrick Ochieng</td>
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<td>NAME</td>
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<td>Claudio Gramizzi</td>
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<td>Berouk Mesfin</td>
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<td>Tamrat Kabede</td>
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Bread for the World – Protestant Development Services